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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

After acceding to political independence in 1975, Papua New Guinea's (PNG)
overall relations with Australia were generally described as dependent 1.

The

relationship was described as dependent because PNG's reliance upon Australia for
economic input (trade, aid and investment), education and as the major source of skilled
manpower recruitment was substantial.

Consequently, PNG's conduct of bilateral

relations with Australia were constrained - this socio-economic dependence also
restricted PNG from pursuing relations with others independent of Australia particularly,
between 1975-19792 . But socio-economic and skilled manpower recruitment were not
the only reasons contributing toward a dependent relationship with Australia.

Other

factors such as, firstly, the inexperience of the PNG foreign affairs officials and
politicians and their getting to know how to conduct the bilateral relations also helped to
make the dependent relationship much deeper than it appeared.

Secondly, PNG's

proximity to Australia implied substantial and continuing interest amongst Australia's
military-strategic and political planners, thereby increasing Australia's influence.
The dependent situation did not emerge suddenly at PNG's political independence
in 1975. The foundations were already set during the period of Australian colonial rule,
particularly beginning in 1962 following the United Nations Visiting Mission (1962) and
the World Bank Mission (1964).

1 See for example A. Amarshi, K. Good and R. Mortimer,

Development and
Dependency: The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea, Melbourne: Oxford
University Press, 1979; P. Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea, London:
Academic Press, 1980; and A. Sawyerr, "Relations of dependence and the PNG-Australia
trade agreement", in A. Sawyerr et. al., (ed.), Law and Social Change in Papua New
Guinea, Melbourne: Butterworths, 1982.
2

See Hamnett, R. Surber, D. Surber and M. Denoncour, "Unbalanced books: economic

vulnerability in the Pacific", Pacific Perspectives, vol. 2 no. 3, 1981: p. 6.
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However, PNG's dependence upon Australia was not necessarily, as argued by other
writers, a consequence of an official policy per se, but stems from the desire of the
colonial Administration (and the Australian Federal Government) to help develop PNG
toward economic self-sufficiency in preparation toward eventual political independence.
Economic self-sufficiency for the Territory of Papua and New Guinea was to be achieved
under policies recommended and espoused by the World Bank and the colonial
Administration such as for example, increased foreign participation to boost economic
activity within the territory which incidentally led to the development of linkages
between foreign investors in the territory and business interests overseas.
In spite of these linkages between domestic and foreign business interests and the
fact that aid relations continued to be the focus of the relationship, PNG's relations with
..

Australia in the 1980s were thought to have "become relatively, but not absolutely, less
important to PNG" 3 .

The relative decline in importance of relations with Australia

occurred because PNG began to diversify its trading partners toward South East Asia
and North East Asia including Japan and Germany (West) with Japan becoming an
important export destination (though Australia retained its status as the major origin of
PNG's imports). Japan also became a substantial aid donor and increasingly Asia was
replacing Australia as an important area of recruitment of skilled personnel.

These

developments led to greater independence by PNG in the conduct of its relations with
Australia. But other issues such as the projected cessation of Australian budget support
by the year 2000, and its gradual replacement by project and program aid, point to the
potential erosion of PNG's independence. How has the shift from budget support to tied
aid impinged upon policy independence? is a question which is answered in the course of
the dissertation.

3 Papua New Guinea Foreign Affairs Review (PNGFAR), vol. I no. 2, 1982 (special
issue)

IV

The analysis of the conduct of PNG's bilateral relations with Australia considered
against the background described above can lead to two possible conclusions: firstly, that
foreign policy directions as enunciated - universalism and active and selective
engagement - were responsible for increasing policy independence in the conduct of
bilateral relations with Australia, and secondly that the manifestation of PNG's policy
independence from Australia was a consequence of its economic diversification (in trade,
aid and investment) and the desire by PNG to be in control of its own destiny.

The

successive universalist and selective and active engagement foreign policy directions had
differing impacts on the conduct of external relations.

Universalism was intended to

accommodate existing global divisions, whilst selective and active engagement was
intended to define in clear terms PNG's basic orientations.

In my view, PNG's policy

independence reflects economic diversification as the principal source of independence
because, without "real" independence (particularly economic), PNG would and could not
be able to sustain a continuous and consistent level of independence over a longer period
of time, which I am suggesting PNG has done since 1980.
However, as I argue in the introduction, PNG's policy independence can also be
attributed to other explanations such as for example, the power of the weak (many
competing diverse interests and Australia's more broader regional and global interests),
political decolonisation and coinciding interests.

I intend in this dissertation to show

how these explanations are relevant in defining PNG's policy independence.
I wish to acknowledge a number of people who helped me in the course of
writing this dissertation.

Firstly, my supervisor, Professor Wolfers of the History and

Politics Department, Wollongong University who went out of his way to secure me a
scholarship and subsequent extensions and his constant encouragement and continued
faith in me; he spent long hours commenting on several unorganised drafts.

Secondly, I

wish to thank Dr Anthony Ashbolt of History and Politics Department, Wollongong
University for taking the time to comment on my final draft. Thirdly, Ms Ellen Aua of
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the Attorney General's Library, Port Moresby for furnishing me with certain documents
which I could not have obtained without her help.

Finally, my wife Casty and son

Gedare who endured my neglect of family duties throughout the length of my studies,
and encouraged me to persevere.
Nevertheless, I take sole responsibility for all misinterpretations or mistakes
encountered in this dissertation.
Dorke de Gedare
University of PNG, 1994.
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Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence
United Nations Institute for Training and Research
United Nations
United States of America
Union of Socialist Soviet Republic

INTRODUCTION
THE THESIS

This dissertation analyses bilateral relations between Australia and PNG.

The

central thesis (of the dissertation) is that, in spite of the high level of dependence by PNG
upon Australia for aid, as a major source of imports, for capital investment and education
and manpower recruitment and training, PNG has been able to pursue an independent
external policy in conducting its bilateral relations with Australia.
In examining the relationship between economic dependence and policy
independence in the Australia-PNG bilateral relationship, the dissertation considers two
important questions:
(a) How have relations changed between 1980 (five years after PNG gained
political independence in 1975)? and 1990; and
(b) Why have relations changed?
The answers to these questions explain the apparent contradiction between the
high level of economic dependence and external policy independence of PNG vis-a-vis
Australia.

THE TIMEFRAME

The dissertation discusses the development of PNG's relations with Australia
between 1980 and 1990.

This period was chosen because of a number of important

developments which contributed to the emergence, development and maintenance of
policy independence in the conduct of bilateral relations with Australia.

The

development of policy independence in PNG in some instances either coincided with
Australia's own national interests or was facilitated by factors such as the first major
change of post-independence Government in 1980, when Sir Julius Chan replaced Mr.
Michael Somare as Prime Minister, the introduction of "active and selective engagement"
as the basis of a new foreign policy direction in 1981 (and subsequent re-endorsement up

2

to the present) replacing universalism (1975-1980) (see chapter 2); the emergence of
major changes in the composition of Australian overseas aid, spurred by Australian
taxpayers' concern for accountability, official reports and parliamentary inquiries 1 and
changes forced upon the Australian Government by economic realities imposed by
international economic recessions and other factors, which led to a shift in emphasis of
future aid toward tied aid (project and program) in 1986 (discussed in detail in chapter
5); the formalisation of the relationship through the signing of the Joint Declaration of
Principles (JDP) in 1987 and subsequent arrangements (for example, the Development
Co-operation Treaty (DCT) in 1989 and The Security Co-operation Principles)
thereafter.
The focus on the 1980s does not mean that the immediate post-independence era
The earlier period will not be neglected because the

(1975-1980) will be neglected.
..

foundations for the changes manifested in the eighties were set in motion during the
immediate post-independence era which are discussed in chapter _2.

Political

independence in 1975 was the major catalyst of change in bilateral relations between
Australia and PNG, because legally that was when PNG attained sole responsibility for
its domestic and external affairs.

But very little of this newly attained political

independence was exploited by PNG between 1975 and 1980 because PNG lacked the
resources to do so, resources such as finance and experienced, skilled manpower. Also,
being newly independent, PNG foreign affairs officials and politicians were still feeling
their way: they were in the process of acquainting and familiarising themselves about
how to conduct external relations2 . As the foreign service officials developed expertise
in the conduct of external relations coupled with the declining novelty of independence,

1 The two

parliamentary inquiries that had major impact upon the change in direction and
the composition of aid were the Crawford Report, 1981 and the Joint Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's Overseas Aid Program (Jackson
Report), Canberra: AGPS, 1985.
2 E. Wolfers, "Foreign relations and foreign policy making in the South Pacific:
independence and beyond", paper delivered to the conference on Post-independence

Relationships in the Pacific Island States held by the Pacific Islands Political Studies
Association in Apia, Western Samoa, 23rd-25th May 1988: 3.

3

the normal development of foreign relations began to emerge and stabilise.

I use the

term normal development to describe the process of foreign policy separation between
the coloniser and the colonised and the transfer of responsibility for determining foreign
policy issues and objectives from the coloniser to the new state as diverging "national
interests" were identified. As in other cases, the normal development of relations led to
disagreements and conflicts between states as each tried to pursue its own particular
national interests.

The emerging disagreements and diplomatic conflict encountered

between the former colony's and the coloniser's foreign policy interests were considered
by the metropolitan country to be discontinuous and consequently misinterpreted and
misunderstood3 .

The disagreements and diplomatic conflict were misinterpreted and

misunderstood because the newly-indpendent state's interests diverged from the former
coloniser's and other major powers', while the colonisers naively did not expect the newly
independent state interests to be drastically different from their own interests.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

As a newly independent state, the Government of PNG embarked upon the
process of establishing a separate national identity amongst the community of nations.
The establishment of a separate identity entailed the formulation and implementation of a
distinct and independent foreign policy4, because the development and the conduct of
external relations is an accepted symbol and a normal outcome of independence and
sovereign statehood. However, in the case of Australia and PNG, writers like Amarshi
et. al. 5 have argued that PNG, being heavily dependent economically on Australia has
little independence in the conduct of its foreign relations.

The above authors'

conclusions are supported by the evidence of data in almost all facets of the relationship development aid, investment capital, trade arid commerce, education and training,

3 Ibid
4

M . Hamnett, R. Surber, D. Surber and M. Denoncour, "Unbalanced books ...", 1981: 6.
5 A. Amarshi, K. Good and R. Mortimer, Development and Dependency ... , 1979.

4

recruitment of skilled manpower: PNG was and continues to be heavily dependent on
Australia. Even with this statistical evidence, PNG has however been able to conduct an
independent foreign policy with Australia.
independence?

What are the reasons for such policy

I shall attempt to answer this question in the latter sections of the

dissertation. Before venturing further, lets define the term dependence.
Dependence has several definitions and explanations6 : (critique of) dualism7;
development of core and periphery8; unequal exchange9 ; and the emergence and the
consequent subordinate role of dependent national bourgeoisie 10 . Dependence however,
is said to be
a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by
the development and expansion of another economy to which it is
subjected ..... [This] leads to a.. .situation in the dependent countries
whereby they are placed in a backward position in relation to, and
under the exploitation of the dominant countries 11 .
Dos Santos' definition of dependence explicitly contends that the development of
dependent countries is determined and constrained by the interests of other more
powerful and developed states to such an extent that almost every socio-political and
economic aspect is subordinated to the dominant countries 12 . Paul Baran argues along
similar lines insisting that

6

T. Angote, "Political implications of dependency", Latin American Perspectives, issues
30/31 vol. 8 nos. 3/4, 1981 : 126.
7 A. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of
Chile and Brazil, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.
8 A. Frank cited by J. Larrain, Theories of Development, London: Polity Press, 1989.
9 S. Amin, Unequal Development, New York: The Harvester Press, 1976.
10 P. Baran cited by A Hoogveldt, The Third World in global development, London:
Macmillan Press, 1982. The dependent national bourgeoisie is also referred to as
a"comprador bourgeoisie".
11 T. Santos, "The crises of development theory and the problem of dependence in Latin
America", H. Bernstein (ed.), Underdevelopment and Development, London: Penguin
Books, 1973: 76; T. Santos cited in A. Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A
Critical Survey, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1980: 177-178; C. Johnson,
"Dependency and the process of capitalism and socialism", Latin American Perspectives,
issues 30/31 nos. 3/4, 1981: 60.
12
Pearson cited in C. Johnson, "Dependency and the process of capitalism and
socialism" ..... , 1981: 60; A. Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperiaism ... , 1980: 178.
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economic development in the underdeveloped countries is profoundly
inimical to the dominant interests in the advanced capitalist
countries 13 .
Even though Baran suggests influence rather than dependence, it is reasonable to
maintain that, that influence is backed by economic power and is the base upon which the
conditions are created for dependence to become manifest.

In spite of the differences, both Dos Santos and Paul Baran agree in general that
the development of the weaker country is usually determined by stronger more powerful
states' (and lending agencies', such as the World Bank's) economic and other interests 14 .
They both imply that the weaker countries do not (necessarily) choose to be subordinate.

If developments in the weaker states are conditioned by powerful countries (and lending
agencies), then economic dependence is merely a manifestation of the process of
economic subordination. Consequently, it is an expected development for foreign policy
to become subordinated to the economic interests of the more powerful country 15 .
Statistics and other data presented in chapters 4 (commerce and investment), 5
(official development assistance) and 6 (defence co-operation) attest to the fact that
PNG's relationship with Australia is a dependent one . Dependency 16 thus, has been the
(logical) framework for the discussion o_
f the relationship between Australia and PNG,
suggesting that most policies (domestic and external) are influenced by Australia.

In

fact, a review of publications and parliamentary inquiries into Australia-PNG bilateral
relations further attests to this conclusion.

P. Baran cited in G. Palma, "Dependency: a formal theory of underdevelopment or a
methodology for the analysis of concrete situations of underdevelopment", World
Development, vol. 6, 1978: 899.
14 E . Wolfers, "PNG's politics and their implications for Australia", in E . Wolfers (ed.),
Australia's Northern Neighbours: Independent or Dependent, Melbourne: Thomas
Nelson (Australia) Ltd., 1976: 2.
15 See an account of Pacific island states dependence upon imported energy in Hamnett
.e.t.al., "Unbalanced books: .. . ", 1981.
16 A. Amarshi, K. Good and R. Mortimer, Development and Dependency: The Political
Economy of Papua New Guinea, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1976; A.
Sawyerr, "Relations of dependence and the PNG-Australia trade agreement", A.
Sawyerr, D. Weisbrot and A. Paliwala (ed.), Law and Social Change in Papu,a New
13

Guinea, Melbourne: Butterworths Pty. Ltd., 1982; P. Fitzpatrick, Law and state in PNG,
London: Academic Press, 1986.

6

In order to understand the explanations discussed below of why PNG has shown
independence in the pursuit of its bilateral relations with Australia and foreign policy in
general, it is important to identify the position of PNG in the hierarchy of states in the
international global pecking order.

PNG is a small state in terms of it's economy,

geography, demography and military establishment (manpower, technology and
readiness) and the availability of educated, skilled manpower.

A United Nations

Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) study into small states (micro or mini)
clnd their problems utilised the definition which appeared in the Introduction- -to the
United Nations General Secretary's Annual Report 1966-1967 when it referred to small
states as entities which are exceptionally small in area, population and human and
economic resources 17 .

PNG under the UN definition has a small land area and lacks

skilled human resources but has a population of almost 4 million and is resource rich.
Most writers (and UNITAR is no exception) emphasise the primary importance of
population as a determinant of a country's status as either small, medium or big.

By

UNITAR's population criterion, which suggests a maximum population ceiling of 1
million, PNG is left outside the small (micro or mini) category.

David Vital in his study

of small states submits that state status can be categorised into great, middle and small
powers, using population as the major criterion, but differing minimum and maximum
ceilings for developed and developing states: for the economically advanced small states,
population ceiling is placed between I 0-15 million, and for the small developing states
population ceiling is determined between 20-30 million 18 .

Furthermore, for Robert

Keohane, small states are categorised as system-ineffectual 19 because states in this

17 UNITAR,

Small States and Territories: Status and Problems, New York: ARNO

Press, 1971: 29.
18 D . Vital cited in R. Keohane, "Lilliputians' dilemas: small states in international
politics", International Organisation, vol. 23, 1969: 294.
19 The other categories identified by Keohane includes (a) system determining; (b)
system-influencing; and ( c) system-affecting. These categories are similar to the
traditional usages of great, secondary, middle and small powers (R. Keohane,
"Lilliputians' dilemmas: small states in international politics", International Organisation,
vol. 23, 1969: p. 296).
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category cannot individually generate significant impact upon the international system,
except as members of a larger group20 .

If population is to be the determining factor,

PNG cannot be considered a small state under Vital's categorisation because PNG has a
population of almost 4 million which is outside of the designated population of 20-30
million maximum required for small developing countries. By UNIT AR's classification
PNG would not be a small state too (as UNITAR defines a state a micro- or ministate if
population does not exceed the maximum of 1 million). Keohane's classification of PNG
as a system-ineffectual state is the most relevant of the potential definitions discussed
above. It is true that PNG on its own cannot, and is unlikely to, have significant impact
upon the international system because PNG's interests are not global, but are regional
and local and can be satisfied locally (unlike say, the United States which has global
interests).

Even though PNG's impact upon the international system is negligible, its

impact upon bilateral relations with Australia and at local and regional levels is quite
significant.
The classifications above of small states implicitly acknowledge the centrality of
power as an important factor in the determination of a state position in the international
system. What is power? Power has a variety of definitions. Power has three common
aspects which are, control over resources, control over actors and control over
outcomes21 . The control over resources, actors and outcomes highlights "what a state
possesses and what a state does" 22 .

Morgenthau suggests that "when we speak of

power, we mean man's control over the minds and actions of other men1123 . But not all
exercise of power is observable - what does not and what does appear on the agenda for
discussion also is defined as an exercise of power24 .

A definition of power which has

20 R. Keohane, "Lilliputians dilemas: ... ", 1969: 295-296; Keohane cited by R. Rothstein,

The Weak in the World of the Strong, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977: 42.
Mifllin Company, (5th edn.),
1992: 188.
22 J. Ray, Global Politics ... , 1992: 188.
23 H. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations:Tthe Struggle for Power and Peace, (4th
edn.), New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967: 26.
24 S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, London: Macmillan, 1974.
2 1 Hart cited by J. Ray, Global Politics, Boston: Houghton

8

the advantage of being widely applicable, thereby lessening the potential for long-drawnout debates is that
Power is the ability to prevail in conflict (war) and overcome obstacles
(non-compliance).
I shall adopt this definition in this thesis.
The ability to prevail and to overcome others depends upon a state's ability to
direct available resources toward controlling necessary efforts and effects upon the target
in order to change its behaviour.

But a change in the targets' behaviour may not be

necessarily a result of the exercise of power - the change may occur because it is in the
interests of the target state to change for itself
After considering the characteristics and definitions of small states -and---power
discussed above, it is clear that individual small states cannot significantly influence
system-wide forces which affect them.

If the foregoing is correct, then why and how

have PNG (and other small states in similar situations) been able to affect and influence
bilateral relations?
There are several possible explanations which are described as (a) the power of
the weak; (b) continuing decolonisation and normalisation; and (c) the coincidence of
socio-political, economic and military strategic interests.

These explanations are

discussed below.

Power of the Weak

The concept of the power of the weak attempts to explain the manifestation of
independence by small states in their relations with bigger and

powerful states.

Arnold Wolfers in 1962 suggested the concept "power of the weak"25 to explain why

25

A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University, 1962.
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small states like Cuba and Albania gained advantage over their superpower neighbours.
Wolfers observes that power of the weak
stems from the relationships among the great powers themselves.
Even for them power is a scarce commodity which they need to
husband with care.
This means placing priorities on its use.
Therefore, whenever two great powers are locked in serious conflict
they can spare little if any of their coercive strength to deal with minor
offenders and to impose their will on them over issues that have no
direct bearing on the major struggle in which they are involved as
equals26 .
The relaxing. of control over .weaker ..states by J.h.e .maj.or .powers emanates .from
the preoccupation with the immediate conflict with other powerful states, creating the
circumstances and expanding opportunities for the exercise of independence by small
states.

In this instance, independence is not a result of the small state's ability to act

independently, but the result of a major powers' rationalisation and direction of resource
allocation and outlays to areas of concern whose eventual outcomes will affect their
interests significantly, either detrimentally or beneficially to their position (as maJor
powers) in the global pecking order.
Power of the weak also manifests itself as a "paradox of unrealised power" which
contends that the ostensibly more powerful states somehow fail to
translate their power resources into actual power27 .
The inability to translate power resources into actual power by major states limits
the range, scope and comprehensiveness of their power on targeted states.

The lack of

effect over target state's behaviour will be determined by the control over and
expenditure of resources by the major power toward the attainmen of the desired effect.
Consequently, small states can act in this environment with a certain degree of policy
independence.
The non-translation of power resources into the actual exercise of actual power
can be attributed to three factors: (a) the loss-of strength gradient, that is, the targeted

26

Ibid: 111-112.

27 J. Ray, Global Politics... , 1992: 189-190.
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party has third party help of similar strength (North Korea was backed by China against
the United States during the Korean war and Vietnam was propped up by the USSR
against the USA during the Vietnam war), compounded by the tyranny of distance of the
conflict making the projection of power more difficult; (b) lack of the resolve to win
brought about by the fact that the reasons are fudged or less important then they might
appear (again exemplified by the Vietnam War); and (c) the existence of a wide range of
foreign policy objectives competing for resources may restrict optimal amounts for
distribution to each objective.

The scarcity of resources leads to prioritisation,

consequently, forcing some objectives to be either scrapped or under-funded28 .

The

three factors have over the centuries been responsible for imbuing in small states an
ambition to be independent of major powers' influence and/ or dominance, and a
recognition that their ambitions can, in practice be attained.

Decolonisation
Decolonisation is commonly defined
as a change in sovereignty, in which a [colonising] state recognises the
[political] independence of people formerly under its rule and their
right· to a government formed according to procedures determined by
them. A new state acting under its own volition, free from the direct
control of foreign actors, comes into existence as part of the
international community29.
Decolonisation directly involves
the severance or transformation of the link between it [new state] and
its administering authority [colonising state] and the creation of an
autonomous system of government30 .
Decolonisation does not only stand for a process whereby a former colony gains
political independence ending formal direct rule, but also includes a variety of other

28 Ibid : 195-199.
29 J. Kruger, The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993: 217.
30 J. Davidson, "Current developments in the South Pacific: the decolonisation of
Oceania", Journal ofPacific History, vol. 6, 1971: 147.
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forms such as incorporation and free association31 .

Most colonies, though, opt for

political independence because independence gives the new states responsibility for their
own government, domestic policy and external relations. Independence also means that
the newly constituted state is the only legitimate authority within the geographically
prescribed boundary of the said entity.
However, the problem of a clear definition of decolonisation emerges from the
ambiguity of the term sovereignty. Sovereignty implies "complete and total control" or
supreme authority within a defined territory and its domestic affairs and a reasonable
degree of independence in the conduct of its external affairs32 .

Sovereignty defined

above does not describe the situations of most small Pacific Island states, even though
their statehood is assured by formal constitutional arrangements. For many such states,
sovereignty is, in many ways, no more than symbolic and does not correlate with , or and
translate into, political, economic and strategic matters33 .

For example, Cook Islands,

Federated States of Micronesia and Niue have gained political independence but final
responsibility for significant aspects of their defence and security - hence foreign affairs remain the responsibilities of their former rulers (respectively, New Zealand, the United
States of America and New Zealand).

In Eastern Europe, a variety of countries were

regarded as sovereign independent states by the international community, but their
policies in most respects were determined by Moscow.

With the crumbling of the

former USSR and its empire, Soviet control over them has disappeared.

This process

might be considered as their "decolonisation". In the light of the disengagement of the
USSR from Eastern Europe, decolonisation would in a broader sense also include the
increased [domestic and external policy] independence of peoples never subjected
directly to such rule34 .

In other words, decolonisation broadly includes freedom from

both direct and indirect political, economic, military-strategic and cultural domination.

31 Ibid
32 H. Bull,
33

The Anarchical Society, London: Macmillan, 1977: 8.
B . Macdonald, "Decolonisation and beyond: the framework for post-colonial
relationships in Oceania", Journal ofPacific History, vol. 21 no. 3, 1986: 116.
34 J. Kruger, The Oxford Companion ... , 1993: 217.
I
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Although all independent states (big and small) are equal under international law,
differences in the practice of sovereignty exist.

The difference between small and big

powers is that sovereignty for bigger, developed states is not just a matter of
international law or constitutional rhetoric but is in part based upon their ability to
sustain themselves economically, politically and militarily whilst for small states'
sovereignty is mostly symbolic.
Sovereignty for the small island states in the Pacific is largely symbolic. Though
politically independent, their independence is restrained by the realities of smallness,

remoteness. and limited resources~?. ·--The. factors. of smallness,...remoteness.and.limited ......... .
resources mean that aspirations for employment, better social services, clean water,
education and better standards of living remain unfulfilled, thereby leading to social
problems (law and order) and political instability.
assistance from foreign sources.

Aspirations are usually met through

For example, PNG an independent country continues

to receive Australian economic aid, which increases the capacity of the economy to meet
the expectations of its citizens36, thereby contributing toward a unified and stable state.
The use of economic aid as leverage to obtain acquiescence from PNG by Australia
remains a real possibility.

Coinciding Interests

Coinciding foreign policy interests between international actors is another source
of policy independence for small states.

Coinciding interests produces co-operation.

For example, the stability of PNG as a viable unified state is in the best security interests
of both Australia and the Government of PNG. Australia helps maintain the status quo
through its aid program.

35 B. Macdonald,
36 Ibid: 118.

"Decolonisation and beyond: ...", 1986: 115-116.
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Co-operation between and amongst small states is a very effective instrument in
affecting and influencing major powers' decisions37 . Co-operation by and between small
states is and can be achieved through the use of multilateral global and regional
organisations, as is the case in the Pacific3 8 .

The signing of a fisheries agreement

between the United States of America and the member states of the Forum Fisheries
Agency is an example of how collaborative action can be of benefit to smaller states in
extracting recognition of their rights, as well as material resources, from a reluctant,
much more powerful state.
The manifestation of small state policy independence from major powers can be and has been - attributed to the explanations of (1) power of the weak; (2)
decolonisation; and (3) coinciding interests.

But (1 ), the power of the weak does not

fully explain the Australia-PNG relationship because there has been very little super
power competition in the region.

PNG's policy independence however, can be said fo

emerge from the fact that Australia's interests are many and more wide-ranging than
PNG's.

All of these interests compete for limited resources, with the result that some

interests and initiatives are more vigorously pursued than others, whilst others may be
shelved until resources became available.

(2), the explanation of coinciding interests as

enhancing the "independence" of the small state does occur as opposition to small state
by the larger, developed (major) state do not arise: as the two states' major policies,
interests, and initiatives coincide. Coinciding interests improve the opportunities for the
attainment of major powers' national interests without undue acrimony.

(3),

decolonisation, if defined in terms of political independence, also invests in a small state
sovereignty (even in its various limited forms), effectively giving that state under
international law the right to have sole responsibility for its domestic and external affairs.
This gives a state (even a small one) a chance to act independently.

37 A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration .. ., 1962: 112; R. Rothstein, The Weak in the

World of the Strong... , 1977.
38 P . Boyce and R. Herr7 "Microstate diplomacy in the South Pacific", Australian
Outlook, vol. 28 no. 1, 1974: 27.
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In this dissertation, power of the weak exercised as a consequence of wideranging interests, decolonisation as political independence and coinciding interests
manifested by parallel external policies will be used to explain policy independence of
PNG.

ORGANISATION

The dissertation is organised into seven chapters including the introduction and
conclusion, each chapter dealing with a specific aspect of the bilateral relationship. The
dissertation does not discuss the totality of the relationship, that is, both private and
public - the dissertation is only concerned with the public aspect of the relationship. Of
the public aspect, the dissertation will only discuss issues relating to the emergence of
policy independence in the bilateral relationship with Australia.
The Introduction presents the thesis and a framework of analysis. This chapter
tries to develop a framework which is used to explain the policy independence of PNG in
(its conduct of) bilateral relations with Australia. Though, investment, commerce and aid
(both economic and defence related) data suggest that policy independence should be
minimal, PNG's policy independence in the (pursuit of) its bilateral relations contradicts
this evidence.

I suggest that the explanations lie in the power of the weak,

decolonisation and coinciding interests, which present PNG with opportunities to
manifest independence.
Chapter one presents a general historical ovefVlew of the development of
relations between Australia and PNG.

It attempts to put post-colonial developments

into perspective by discussing colonial policies and administration. I will not try to trace
the colonisation process from annexation to independence, but I will discuss only those
developments which I believe are relevant to the development of PNG's policy
independence, particularly the period between 1960 and 1979. I will also discuss the
preparation of a foreign office in 1973/4, marking the transfer of de facto (not legal)
control of PNG's relations with Australia and other countries and international entities
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following the appointment of the Minister for Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade39 . In
February 1975, responsibility for external relations was transferred to the Minister for
Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade in PNG, some seven months before formal, legal
independence.
The second chapter considers Australia-PNG relations in the overall context of
PNG's foreign policy. The purpose of this chapter is to see if PNG's foreign policy has
been a result of this independence or if these foreign policy directions have been
responsible for the facilitation of independence in PNG's interaction with Australia.
Commerce and investment are discussed in chapter three.

The contentions in

this section will be two-fold: firstly, that PNG's diversification program away from
Australia has been responsible for increasing PNG independence, and secondly - a
somewhat contradictory development - that the diversification is a manifestation of the
continuous development of policy independence.

I shall attempt to show that, whilst

PNG is economically dependent on Australia, such dependence did not unnecessarily
restrain PNG in its bilateral relations.
Official development assistance is the concern of chapter four.

It was the

centrepiece of bilateral relations from independence until the Joint Declaration of
Principles was signed in 1987.

The gradually decreasing level of budget support and a

shift to project and program aid since 1986 have been viewed differently by both
Australia and PNG.

From PNG's viewpoint, budget support reductions entail a

significant decline in policy independence, with a shift to project and program aid, which
increases Australia's influence over PNG's development policies. From Australia's view,
the shift to project and program aid is necessary to improve accountability.

I will

attempt in this chapter to determine the significance and impact of the shift.
Chapter five discuses security issues and defence co-operation between the two
countries. This chapter will attempt to make a case that, for PNG, security encompasses
non-military aspects, such as law and order problems arising from lack of economic

39

E. Wolfers, "Foreign relations and foreign policy making ... ", 1988: 6.
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development.

Resource (mineral) development related issues and conflicts over land

and compensation and in Bougainville have become important and prime areas of
concern.

As a consequence, Australian defence aid has come to embrace not only

strictly military related projects but also included aid to police (training and
accommodation), law and order (court training), civic projects (engineering and
construction), and building the administrative capability and capacity of the security
forces.

This leads to the development of a certain degree of self reliance and

independence in setting domestic and external security policy directions.
In the concluding chapter, six, I shall attempt to suggest that the sources of small
state independence identified above do not necessarily imply that all small states manifest
similar levels of independence. Some small states may be more independent than others,
for example, Switzerland wields more political clout than say PNG globally because of
the nature of the services it supplies to the world. In the case of PNG and Australia, I
shall argue that other factors such as Australia's desire for a politically stable neighbour,
gives PNG added leverage for policy independence.
Finally a word of caution.

I do not intend in the dissertation to discuss PNG's

bilateral relations with other countries.

If these other bilateral relations are mentioned,

they will only be mentioned in the context of the dissertation's main concerns.

The

dissertation is not a study of the whole of PNG's foreign policy; it is focused on PNG's
relations with Australia.

CHAPTER 1

ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

Papua New Guinea acceded to political independence on 16 September 1975
after 69 years in Papua and 61 years in New Guinea of Australian colonial rule.

My

intention in this chapter is not to trace the process of annexation and colonisation, but to
discuss and identify developments that may have contributed to the emergence of policy
independence in PNG, for example, the establishment of a foreign office in 1973.
Contrary to existing literature which describes PNG's policy process as dependent on
Australia, I will argue that Australia did attempt to develop conditions for the emergence
of (foreign) policy independence in an independent PNG.

AUSTRALIAN COLONIAL POLICY AUDIT

The deficiencies of post-Worl War II Australian administration and colonial
policies in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea were highlighted by a United Nations
Visiting Mission in 1962 and a subsequent economic report submitted by the World
Bank Mission (IBRD) to the territory in 1963.

The 1962 United Nations Visiting Mission

The 1962 United Nations Visiting Mission to Nauru and New Guinea was led by
a prominent English, civil servant, Sir Hugh Foot.

Though the report acknowledged

and commended Australia on the developments achieved up to 1962, the UN Mission
still argued that development was slow when compared to the rate of decolonisation in
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Africa.

The report described existing Australian policy as inadequate, and

recommended accelerated progress in all spheres of the society 1 .
The report stated
First, it is essential to be ahead and not behind the rapidly awakening
and increasingly insistent desire of the people for material progress.
Secondly, it is necessary to equip the people, with higher education to
take a leading share and not merely a subordinate part, in the
management of their own affairs. Thirdly, the whole territory must be
drawn together and given the means for free political expression by the
creation of a representative parliament.
We are convinced that there should___be no delay _whatever in pressing
on to achieve these three purposes. Then the way will be cleared for
increasing the pace and momentum of progress towards the declared
object of national self-determination2 .
In an attempt to speed up the process of decolonisation, the 1962 UN Visiting
Mission recommended: (I) a full economic survey to be undertaken by the World Bank
in 1963; (2) a new program for the establishment of a national university and higher
education in the territory; and (3) an immediate plan for the election of a representative
parliament3, all of which should be effected no later then the end of December, 1963.
The only recommendation carried out by 1963 was the full economic survey, whilst the
other two - a fully representative parliament and the establishment of a university and the
development of tertiary education - were implemented in 1964 and 1966 respectively.
The impact of the three recommendations upon the preparation of PNG for eventual
political independence will be discussed below.

1 A. Healy, "The Foot Report and East New Guinea", The Australian Quarterly, vol. 34

no. 3, 1962: 11; P. Grenfell, The Challenge of New Guinea: Australian Aid to Papuan
Progress, Melbourne: Angus and Robertson, 1966: 10.
2 United Nations Visiting Mission, Report on New Guinea together with the relevant
resolutions of the Trusteeship Council official records, 29th Session 31st May-20th July
1962, Supplement no. 3, New York: United Nations, 1962: 32; A. Healy, "The Foot
Report ... ", 1962: 11.
3 Ibid.: 16.
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The 1963 World Bank Report

The 1963 World Bank Mission's visit to PNG, commissioned by the Australian
Government was a direct response to the recommendation made by the United Nations
Visiting Mission to Nauru and New Guinea in 1962.

The Bank was expressly directed

to make a full survey of the territory's economic potential and to make recommendations
to assist the Australian Government in planning a development program to stimulate and
expand the economy4.
The aim of the survey by the World Bank was to find areas of the economy
where indigenes might participate in order for the territory to become economically selfreliant and so ready for early self-government.

To this end, the World Bank

recommended the expansion of production of cash crops such as copra, coffee, cocoa
and rubber.

To attain economic self-sufficiency and eventual political independence, a

program of economic development over a five year period was proposed between
1964/1965 and 1968/1969.

Effectively, political development was linked to economic

development, that is, political development would only be pursued after a self-sustaining
economic base had been established within the territory.

In years, when political

independence was discussed, this stance was adopted by the Leader of the Opposition
and the United Party, Sir Tei Ahal, in opposing immediate independence or independence
in the "near future"5. . Increased economic activity and greater indigenous participation
meant subsequent increases in indigenous income and wealth, the broadening of the tax
base, the disproportionate gap between government expenditures and revenues in the
territory narrowing and the widening deficit in the balance of payments (met by
Australian Government grants) reduced6 .

This economic program was aimed at

attaining self-reliance and independence.

4 World Bank, The Economic Development of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea,
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965: vii; 31.
5 Papua and New Guinea House of Assembly Hansard, 27th November 1973.
6 World Bank, The Economic Development of the Te"itory of Papua and New
Guinea .. ., 1965: 32.
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Issuing from the UN and the World Bank reports, the colonial administration
developed the first five-year plan for 1968/1969 to 1972/1973.

The plan was an

economic guide intended to increase cash cropping and livestock production, investigate
the possibility of more profitable exploitation of natural resources, and expand the
commercial infrastructure of the economy7 .

The

plan incorporated the

recommendations for increased indigenous participation by providing incentives like
capital financing, however, as discussed below, it was not very successful.

Increasing

indigenous participation was basically an instance of trickle-down during the 1960s, but
then became government policy in the lead-up to eventual political independence in
1975.

The second five year plan began in 1973/1974 and ended in 1977/1978.

The

second five year plan was concerned primarily with distribution, to which the Somare-led
Government gave official sanction by the enunciation of an 8 point plan in 1973 8 . The

7 J. Waiko, A Short History of Papua New Guinea, Melbourne: Oxford University Press,

1993 : 55.
8 The 8 point plan was intended to facilitate distribution to Papua New Guineans by
(I) a rapid increase in the proportion of the economy under the control
of Papua New Guinean individuals and groups and in the proportion of
personal and property income that goes to Papua New Guineans;
(2) more equal distribution of economic benefits, including movements
towards equalisation of income among people and towards equalisation
of services, among different areas of the country;
(3) decentralisation of economic activity, planning and government
spending, with emphasis on agricultural development, village industry,
better internal trade and more spending channelled to local and area
bodies;
(4) an emphasis on small-scale artisan, service and business activity,
relying where possible on typically Papua New Guinean forms of
activity;
( 5) a more self-reliant economy, less dependent for its needs on
imported goods and services and better able to meet the needs of its
people through local production;
(6) an increasing capacity for meeting Government spending needs
from locally raised revenue;
(7) a rapid increase in the equal and active participation of women in
all forms of economic and social activity; and
(8) government control and investment in those sectors of the economy

where control is necessary to achieve the desired kind of development
(Papua New Guinea House ofAssembly Debates, February 1973).
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first five year plan had tangible and attainable objectives and goals by which the success
of Australia's commitment could be measured, but the second five year plan was less
tangible, and the measurement of success was difficult to measure. Because the first five
year plan was an Australian plan, it put pressure on Australia to lift its performance as it
would reflect negatively upon their commitment to developing PNG toward eventual
independence ifthe objectives were not attained within the defined time-frame.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The World Bank recommendations and the first five year plan produced by the
colonial Administration made economic development the primary focus.

The economy

was viewed by the World Bank and the colonial Administration as a revenue base upon
which other non-income generating sectors (particularly socio-welfare and political)
development depended. The first five year development plan (1967/1968 to 1972/1973)
was to be financed domestically and by increasing Commonwealth grants to the
Territory.

But, there were several drawbacks impeding the success of this strategy.

Real expenditures prior to the first five year plan were well above territorial revenue
collected and Commonwealth grants combined.

For example, by 1960, gross domestic

product was recorded at 42 million pounds, based upon external financial assistance and
non-indigenous enterprise9 amounting to a little more than one third of approved budget
expenditureslo.

The plan's expected per annum expenditure, projected at about A50.2

million pounds during the next five years (also expected to increase annually by about 5
percent resulting from inflation and other unexpected costs), was well out of the reach of
the Territory's revenue. The expected annual expenditure exceeded total Administration

D . Bettison et. al., lhe Independence of Papua-New Guinea: What are the Prerequisites, four lectures presented under the auspices of the Public Lectures Committee
of the ANU, Angus and Robertson Ltd.: Sydney, 1962: 28.
IO E. Fisk, "The economy of Papua-New Guinea", D. Bettison et. al., lhe Independence
of Papua-New Guinea ..., 1962: 64.
9

22

expenditure by about one third, A33.46 million pounds in 1962/63 11 . The difficulty was
further compounded by low internal revenue raising capacity, averaging around
A$42,495,200 per annum over the five year period (1964/65 - 1968/69) - still almost the
same as that recorded for 1960.

The other problem hindering economic development

was the land tenure system, which excludes private ownership and more importantly,
secure, bankable individual title. All land is communally owned making land acquisition
extremely difficult.

The availability of fertile land also played a part in undermining

economic development as only 3 percent of the land was arable.

However, the major

impediment to the success of the plan was the financing aspect.

The lack of internal

revenue capacity of the Territory led the colonial Administration to look elsewhere to
identify potential sources to fund the economic plans, including foreign investment,
domestic financing and increasing Commonwealth grants.

Foreign Investment

The World Bank solution to remedying the shortage of capital to finance PNG's
economic development was to recommend the increase of foreign participation and
investment in the territory's economy 12 . The Commonwealth Government of Australia
concurred when the then Minister for External Territories Mr. C. E. Barnes in 1965
asserted that PNG could not attain economic self-reliance on its own, but only through a
conscious program of dependence in the short-term on foreigners for financing the
plan13. But not everybody accepted the first colonial Administration's five year plan and
foreign financing with open arms. Dr. Ron Crocombe, then Executive Officer of ANU's

The Economic Development of the Territory of Papua and New
Guinea ... , 1965: 55.
12 Ibid.: 40-41; H. Jackman, "Economic policy in New Guinea", Australian Outlook,
vol. 28 no. 2, 1974: 154.
13 C. E. Barnes, "Report of IBRD Mission on the economic development of Papua and
New Guinea", statement tabled in the House of Representatives on Wednesday 5th May
1965: 4.
11 World Bank,
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Research Unit in Port Moresby, described it as "token" saying "that while the plan
talked at great length of indigenous 'participation', it in effect arranged for increasing
expatriate domination of the [territory's] economy1114 .

Though it was directed toward

economic self-reliance and a short term measure, the plan nevertheless laid the
foundations for foreign dominance in the Territory's economy.

The World Bank's and

the Australian Commonwealth Government's policy of encouraging foreign investment to
participate in the economic development of PNG underlined the general weakness and
lack of economic development within the territory, particularly the inability and the
difficulty of raising internal capital.
The increased inflow of foreign investment capital immediately after the 1963
World Bank report significantly boosted economic activity in the territory, indicated by
the increase in total acreage planted by both indigenes and non-indigenes of the major
tree crops (coconuts, coffee, cocoa and rubber) from 725,083 in 1964 to 839,617 acres
in 1967, averaging about 279,872 per year 15 (Commonwealth Bureau of Census and
Statistics, various years).

14 R. Crocombe, cited by P. Hastings, New Guinea: Problems and Prospects, Victoria:

Cheshire, 1969: 87.
15 Ibid
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Table 1: Aggregate Acreage Planted for Major Cash Crops for Selected YearsI6
Indigenous

Non-indigenous

Total

Coconuts
1964
1965 to 1967
1968 to 1970
1971 to 1973

242,346
1,063, 135
621,418
137,469(a)

267,578
795,557
490,114
325,035

509,121
681 ,699
1,111,532
462,504

Cocoa
1964
1965 to 1967
1968 to 1970
1971 to 1973

29,430
107,345
76,400
19,475(a)

112,404
365,354
237,048
171,631

141,834
472,679
313,448
74,150

Coffee
1964
1965 to 1967
1968 to 1970
1971 to 1973

30,049
123,240
91,738
22,20l(a)

10,851
40,008
26,845
19,536

40,900
163,248
118,583
41,737

Rubber
1964
1965 to 1967
1968 to 1970
1971 to 1973

631
5,204
7,336
l,960(a)

33,797
105,777
63,366
40, 716

34,428
110,981
70,702
42,676

(a) Indigenous acreage planted figures not available for 1972 and 1973

The breakdown of total acreage planted between indigenes and non-indigenes for
the same years (between 1965 and 1967) was 1,121,931 and 1,306,696 acres
respectively. Total acreage planted annually gradually increased, peaking in 1968 at the
start of the first five year plan. After 1968, new acreage planted declined.

The decline

occurred because areas designated for planting had either been completed or new
projected areas for plantings had been suspended. However, by 1973, this exercise saw
an estimated proportion ofland area under foreign ownership exceed 70 percent in cocoa
and rubber and 40 percent in copra 17 .

This means that whilst indigenes accounted for

16 Figures compiled from Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Official

Yearbook ofAustralia (various years).
17 S. Rao and S. Ganguli, "The limitations of export-led growth", in A. Sawyerr (ed.),
Economic Development and Trade in Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby: UPNG Press,
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60 percent of area under coconut production, indigenes accounted for only 30 percent of
area under cultivation of cocoa and rubber.
Increasing economic activity was also reflected in the value of exports from the
territory.

In 1964/65 total value of exports was A$43,312,000 but by 1972/73 it had

reached A$229,614,000 18 . The dominant export commodities (coconuts, coffee, cocoa
and rubber) comprised about 80 percent of total exports between 1964 and 1970, falling
in 1970/71 to 78 percent and thence declining to 22 percent in 1973/74 as a proportion
of real value. The decline in export value of cash crops coincided with the Bougainville
Copper Mine coming on stream(i.e. the decline was relative to growth in copper, gold
and silver exports) ..

Domestic Financing

A variety of commercial :financing institutions provided financial assistance to
indigenous businessmen, including the Papua New Guinea Development Bank (PNGDB)
which was established in the late 1960s, and co-operative societies, many of which dated
back to the 1950s.

Peter Hastings' study of the PNGDB suggests that indigenous

businessmen did not benefit sufficiently from its loans to change the basic structure of the
economy at all quickly.

1984: 37.
18

Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Official Yearbook of Australia,

1970: 1001 and 1974: 1079.
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Table 2: PNG Development Bank Loans (1967 Estimates)l9
Number
of Applicants

Amount (A$)

New Guineans
Mixed Racial Partnerships
and Applicants
Expats/Non-indigenous

125
12

122,914
615,481

66

1,207,041

Total

203

1,945,436

The estimates suggest that 54 percent of Papuan and New Guinean applicants
accounted for only 6.3 percent of total loans in monetary value. Expatriate applicants,
comprising 32 percent of total applicants, accounted for the bulk of the total bank loans
at 62 percent, while 5.9 percent of mixed racial partnerships and applicants accounted for
31. 6 percent of the total volume of loans. A House of Assembly statement in June 1969
confirmed the estimates, recording that from July 1967 to the end of May 1969, 870
indigenes had received loans totalling A$1.3 million (at an of average A$1,494 per
applicant), while 230 expatriates and non-indigenous (including mixed race or Chinese)
received A$8.3 million (an average of A$36,086 per applicant)20 .

The above suggests

that indigenous participation as recommended by the World Bank was barely helped by
the establishment of the PNGDB.
A different picture emerges in a study by Scott MacWilliam of the same financial
institution over an 8 year period between 1967 and 1975.

In his study, Scott

MacWilliam found that, out of the total loans of A$49 million; A$21.5 million went to
Papuans and New Guineans, that is, 44 percent21 . The increasing percentage of loans to
indigenes recorded by MacWilliam may have been spurred on by Papua New Guinean
sentiments of economic nationalism, particularly between 1967 and 1975. Nationalism
defined as business ownership and hence economic control was given official

19 These figures are from P. Hastings, New Guinea: Problems and Prospects, Victoria:

Cheshire, 1969: 94.
20 Ibid. : 95.
21 S. MacWilliam, "International capital, indigenous accumulation and the state in PNG:
the case of the Development Bank", Capital and Class, no. 29, 1986: 154.
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Government approval with the enunciation of the "8 Point Plan" which called for the
transfer of businesses to nationals.

Nationalism was later used as a basis for the

distribution of plantations under the Plantations Redistribution Act.

Under this scheme,

of the 1,200 plantations in the Territory, only 81 (7 percent) had been purchased under
the plan between 1974 and March 1981 22 . The pressures to nationalise had a negative
effect on the plantation economy: firstly, there was a decline in plantation production
because of the lack of indigenous experience and proper management, and, secondly, the
uncertainties created by the impending changes in ownership and disagreements over
compensation led to plantations being run down, and, thirdly, most of the plantations
were reaching their end of life and needed replanting23 . Nationalism, backed by public
pressure for increased participation in economic development was thus incorporated as
an official policy to mobilise the population to support political independence, and as an
avenue through which economic control could be taken away from foreign ownership
before independence actually came in 1975.

Australian Commonwealth Grants and Internal Revenue

Total Australian grants to PNG before independence, in the 1963/64 financial
year reached A$6 l, 098, 000, about five sevenths of total government expenditure, from
A$38,196,000 in 1960/61 to A$44,446,000 in 1961/62 and A$49,782,000 in 1962/6324 .
In 1964/65, Commonwealth grants increased to A$67,998,000, and by 1973/74 the

government grant element had reached A$177,076,000.

However, the increase in total

annual grants from the 1970/1971 financial years onwards also included grants under the
Colombo Plan.

22 P. Eaton, "The plantation redistribution scheme in PNG", in A. Sawyerr (ed.),
Economic Development and Trade in PNG, Port Moresby: UPNG Press, 1984: 59.
23 Bank of PNG, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, December 1979: 6.
24 Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Official Yearbook of Australia,
1965: 123; P. Grenfell, The Challenge of New Guinea ... , 1966: 13.
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Table 3: Annual Australian Commonwealth Grants to the Territory of PNG and
Internal Revenue before Independence, 1963-1974 (A$) 25•
Financial Year

Grant Amount

Internal Revenue

1964/65
1965/66
1966/67
1967/68
1968/69
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972/73
1973/74

67,998,000
75,167,000
83,784,000
91,645,000
98,853,000
102,466,000
121,968,000(a)
136,536,000(a)
144,302,000(a)
177,076,000(a)(b)

27,929,000
35,320,000
44, 190,000
49,900,000
55, 137,000
72,442,000
83,666,000
95,253,000
93,062,000
136,368,000

(h) As from 1970/71, the following additional amounts which-were-not part-of the PNG----- --budget were provided by the Australian Government: for Australian Staffing Assistance
(salaries and allowances) in 1970/71 A$3 L5 million was provided, in 1971/72, A$38-3
million and in 1972/73 A$43 .3 million. Also A$0.8 million was provided for termination
and retirement benefits, and A$ l .1 million for emergency food relief in the Highlands in
1971/12. In 1973/74, A$49.9 million was provided for Australian Staffing Assistance,
and A$ l 7.0 million for termination and retirement benefits.
(b)
Assistance under the Colombo Plan and United Nations Special Program are
included
Internal

revenue

increased from

A$158,166,000 in 197426 .

A$29,000,000

in

1964/65

to

about

Since internal revenue and Commonwealth grants were,

totally, insufficient before 1963/64 to finance the projected expenditures recommended
by the World Bank and the colonial Administration's first five year program, increasing
Commonwealth Government grants became an important instrument in financing the five
year program and the eventual 5 year plans from 1967/1968 onwards.

Increases in

Commonwealth grants had begun in the 1950s which continued right up to and after
independence in 1975.

Whilst Commonwealth grants were increasing and internal

25 All these figures are collated from the Commonwealth Bureau of Census and

Statistics, Official Yearbook. .., various years; Commonwealth of Australia Federal
Parliament, Budget Speeches, various years.
26

Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Official Yearbook. .. , 1970: 1003;

1974: 1083.
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revenue also increased, in comparison internal revenue still remained less than the total
annual Commonwealth grants to the Territory.
By percentage of participation, investment and control by Australian based
commercial interests in the Territory's economy accounted for 85 percent of retail trade
by value of tumover2 7, because most of the foreign investors and investment originated
in Australia. Even so, indigenes producers dominated coffee production, whilst nonindigenes were prominent in coconut, cocoa and rubber production.

Even though

indigenes acreage gradually increased in coconut plantings, non-indigenes produced
greater amounts of copra (including other tree crops such as coffee, cocoa and rubber),
belying the fact that acreage planted favoured indigenous. The monetary value of nonindigenous owned tree crops plantation (coffee, cocoa and coconut products) production
accounted for A$57.3 million or 70 percent of the total A$76.8 million agricultural
exports for the 1971-1972 period. Of the 70 percent total of non-indigenous production,
Australian owned plantations contributed about A$24 million or approximately 33
percent of total non-indigenous output28.

MANPOWER AND TRAINING
In 1963 there was a 95, 000 labour force, whose wages were paid in both cash

and kind in the public and private sectors.

Indigenous labour accounted for 76,800

(women 1,600), comprising about 81 percent of the total potential active labour force
(which was much higher), and 13 percent of the estimated adult male population of
600,00029 .

The distribution of indigenous labour in the various economic and social-

welfare sectors, was determined by the level of skills required for participation.

The

bulk of the indigenes were employed in the agriculture (plantations) and the forestry
sectors, which required few or no skills at all, for example in coffee cherry picking, copra
27 R. Premdas, "Toward a PNG foreign policy: constraints and choices",

Outlook, vol. 30 no. 2, 1976: 267.
265, 266.
29 World Bank, The Economic Development ... , 1965: 282.

28 Ibid.:

Australian
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making and drying, plantation cleaning and logging. About 3.5 percent were employed
in the manufacturing sector, still not as skilled technicians but as packers and sorters, and
about 30 percent in government service as junior civil servants30 .
After more than 50 years of colonial rule, limited progress was made in training
indigenes in professional categories like teaching, nursing, agricultural officers, clerks,
police and prison officials between 1960 and 196931 _ For example, by 1968 there were
507 indigenous trained teachers from both government and mission colleges.

The

indigenous numbers increased to about 4,725 teachers in 1970 out of a total of 5,429
teachers (of the indigenes, 4615 were at primary and 110 at high school levels) 32 .

By

the year of independence in 1975, nationals teaching at community schools accounted for
7,400 out of a total of 7,475, but the number of nationals teaching at high schools was
less impressive, rising only by 302 (up from 110 in 1970 to 412 in 1975)33 .
Managerial and professional jobs in the private and public sectors were filled by
expatriates.

Statistics available confirm that, at least, expatriates accounted for 95

percent of professional and managerial manpower, and 75 percent of technical, subprofessional and middle-level managerial personnel34 . By 1972, only 553 indigenes had
graduated from universities and been recruited into the civil service.

By comparison,

during the same year (1972) the number of expatriates recorded in both the private and
public sector was 7,ooo35_
The high numbers of skilled and experienced expatriates in managerial, technical
and policy oriented jobs meant foreigners wielded a lot more influence in economic and
overall government policy than indigenous officers leading up to and immediately after

30 Ibid.: 282.

31 P. Hastings, New Guinea ... , 1969: 292-294.
32 S. Roakeina, "The educational system in PNG", in 0 . Dwivedi and N. Paulius (eds.),
The Public Service of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby: Administrative College, 1986:
314.
33 Ibid.
34 J. Griffin, H. Nelson and S. Firth, PNG: A Political History, Victoria: Hienemann

Educational Australia, 1979: 163.
35 Ibid: 198.
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independence. Expatriate influence upon economic and general government policy was
largely due to expatriate seniority, experience, know-how and placement as advisers to
key individuals in politics and the bureaucracy, or in some instances as a result of seeking
public office through the political process and via other specific interest groups and
lobbies. The few indigenes recruited into the civil service were given little help and few
opportunities to participate in policy-making as opposed to routine administration36.
The lack of managerial knowledge and expertise among the then civil servants in PNG
reflects the colonial Administration's pre-occupation with training regarding conventional
law and order administration rather than the management of social and economic
development37 .

EDUCATION

There was a marked change in the colonial Administration's attitude toward
indigenous education after the UN Visiting Mission of 1962.

The United Nations

Visiting Mission strongly recommended the introduction of education which would
qualify indigenes for tertiary studies. The new enthusiasm and vigour shown by the
colonial Administration toward indigenous education was translated into reality with the
expansion of primary and high schools (both international and national).

In 1960,

primary 'T' and primary 'A' schools had a total enrolment of 92,029 pupils, with about
2, 170 pupils in high schools.

By 1970, the number of students at primary 'T' and

primary 'A' schools had increased to about 215,258, whilst secondary pupil numbers had
increased to 22,888.

The increase in numbers of students was directly related to the

increase in the number of places available as new schools were established.

However,

36 E. Wolfers and P. Loveday, Parties and Parliament in Papua New Guinea 1964-75,

IASER Monograph no. 4, 1976: 2.
37 0. Dwivedi, "Growth of the public service in PNG", in 0. Dwivedi and N. Paulius
(eds.), The Public Service in PNG ... , 1986: 7.
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the majority of student numbers in both primary 'A' and international high schools were
non-indigenes with about 1,000 indigenes in 1973 (they were banned from attending
international high schools)38, and thus these schools did not contribute much to the
advancement of indigenous education.
Substantial increases were attained m the numbers of indigenous students
enrolled at both the primary and secondary levels between 1960 and 1970.

Enrolments

at primary schools increased by about 119, 740 whilst secondary enrolments recorded an
increase of 15,865.

Table 4: PNG School Statistics(a) 1960, 197tf3 9
1960(c)

Type of school(b)

Institution
Community
Prov. High
Int'l Prim.
Int'l High

1970

Students

Institution

Students

1, 141
39

88,679
2,064

1,557
62

208,419
17,929

46

3,350

63

116

6,839
4,959

70

3,140
1,575

12
2

1,476
772

Vocational
Tech. col.

11

577
676

Teacher tmg.
University

26
00

814
000

a. Data are not strictly comparable due to changing school structures
b. Current terminology
c. Data for 1960 are not fully reliable due to inconsistency in records
With regard to post-secondary education, the United Nations Visiting Mission
recommended to the Australian Government the establishment of a national university to
redress the shortcoming in tertiary education. The University of PNG opened its doors
in 1966 with an initial student intake of 3 7. The Institute of Higher Technical Education

38 Papua and New Guinea House ofAssembly Debates, March 1973.
39 Data compiled by S. Weeks and G. Guthries, "PNG", in R . Thomas and T.

Postlethwaite (ed.), Schooling in the Pacific: Colonies in Transition, Oxford: Pergamon,
1984: 45; S. Roakeina, "The educational system in PNG" ..., 1986: 306.
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was also initially established in Port Moresby, but later moved to Lae, becoming the
PNG University of Technology in 1967.
University of PNG in 1970.

The first students graduated from the

By 1972 the number of students enrolled at university

(including the University of Technology in Lae) numbered around 772.

Though the

number of teacher training colleges had dropped by 14 to 12 by 1970, the number of
teacher trainees increased by 662 between 1960 and 1970. The biggest increase in the
number of post-secondary colleges was evidenced in the technical colleges rising by
about 59 between 1960 and 1970 with total student enrolments also increasing by about
899. -The number of vocational trainees increased also by about 2,563 students.
The places available for indigenes to pursue western education increased
dramatically between 1960 and 1970. When there was no university education in the
Territory prior to 1966, only a very few indigenes had access to such education in
Australia.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Unlike its preoccupation with the economy, the colonial Administration showed
little enthusiasm for nurturing indigenous participation in, and knowledge of the political
process. The Administration pursued a contradictory policy: whilst the Administration
encouraged and helped in the establishment of local government councils, the
administration also simultaneously discouraged the inhabitants from participating in
certain political activities such as forming political parties and becoming independent of
the administration in decision-making. The colonial Administration justified this
contradictory policy by arguing that political development and change should only occur
in accordance with the wishes of the people40 : in other words, political development
would not be encouraged if it did not conform to the preceding. This policy was viewed

40

D. Wolford, PNG: Initiation and Independence, Queensland: Queensland University

Press, 1976: 4.
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by the colonial administration as appropriate to, and was in fact in line with, the
immediate policy concentration on economic development as a necessary pre-condition
and objective before political development could be encouraged41 .

The economy-

centred policy assumed that political stability could only be sustained in a newly
independent state upon a well founded and strongly developed self-sufficient economic
base.
The economy-centred policy was a major element in the colonial Administration's
argument for deferring the overall objective of eventual self-rule by conscientiously
fostering a very gradualist approach to political development throughout the 1950s and
the 1960s4 2. Hastings confirms this view when he records that the
primary aim of Australian policy in New Guinea had been to prevent
the emergence of the desire for political independence; and to prevent
it for the best of gradualist reasons even if they should ultimately prove
··
the most misplaced43.

Local Government Councils (LGCs)

In spite of the official Administration policy of discouraging certain aspects of
political organisation, participation and activities, political development in the form of
LGCs at the village level did emerge.

Local Government Councils were established

under the 1949 Native Village Council Ordinance.

The first LGCs were established

after late 1949. By the early 1960s, there was a total of 89 LGCs covering a population
of almost I million.
The colonial Administration was quite supportive in the establishment of local
level administrative structures - in fact, the Administration promoted their establishment
in the first place. Wolfers concurs with such a view by recording that

41 E. Wolfers, "PNG's politics and their implications for Australia" ..., 1976: 118.

42 E . Wolfers and P. Loveday, Parties and Parliament..., 1976.
43 P. Hastings, New Guinea ... , 1969: 156.
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political act1vtt1es [were] systematically ignored or more usually
opposed by government officers .... .Councils and even trade unions
[were] established with the assistance, and subject to the supervision of
government officers and actively discouraged or legally prevented from
taking part in politics44.
Because LGCs were usually established by the colonial Administration and
existed under their direct control, it is not surprising to note that the LGCs remained
under the administration's direct supervision.
The LGCs had two important purposes:
(a) to provide a link between villagers and the administration and
attempt to enforce western law, and (a) to learn and understand
western democratic process45.
Not all indigenous had high regard for LGCs, however.

Some indigenes viewed

LGCs as nothing more than (the) extensions of the central administration, and thus,
subservient to Administration directives.

First House ofAssembly Elections, 1964

The 1962 United Nations Mission led by Sir Hugh Foot, recommended the
establishment of a 100 member truly representative parliament by the end of 1964, but
the size of the 1964 House of Assembly was adopted from recommendations made by a
Select Committee of the Legislative Council46 .

Thus, when the first elected House of

Assembly came into being in 1964, replacing the existing Legislative Council, the House
of Assembly comprised a clear majority of elected members - 44 members of any race
elected by universal adult sufilage, 10 non-native members elected on the same basis and

1O official members appointed by the Governor General of Australia on the nomination
of the Administrator47 .

The 10 official members were appointed under the Papua and

44 E. Wolfers, "PNG's politics and their implications for Australia" .. ., 1976: 490-491.
45 J. Waiko, A Short History of PNG, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1993 : 176.

46 E. Wolfers and P. Loveday, Parties and Parliaments ..., 1976: 5.
47 World Bank, The Economic Development of the Territory ... , 1965: 5.
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New Guinea Act 1949-195048 .

However, indigenous members remained ineffective

participants because most of the debates were conducted in English and most of them
spoke only Tok Pisin or Hiri Motu (apart from their respective vernacular languages).
Prior to the 1968 elections for the Second House of Assembly, two important
developments took place. Firstly, in 1965 John Guise successfully moved in the House
of Assembly for the establishment of a Select Committee to look at proposals to guide
constitutional development for the territory49.

This committee was chaired by Guise

and toured the territory seeking the public's proposals.

Secondly, at about the same

time, an Under-Secretary system was established so that selected indigene members
could gain experience in the running and operations of the government.

The Under-

Secretaries were selected and appoint,ed by the Administrator.

Second House of Assembly Elections, 1968

Elections for the Second House of Assembly were held in 1968.

The 1968

elections saw a decline in the number of official members and an increase in the number
of members elected by adult suflTage.

There were I 0 official members after the 1968

general elections which included the Deputy Administrator, Secretary of Department of
Administrator, Secretary of Finance and Secretary for Law and a few others appointed
by the Administrator50.
The 1968 elections saw an increase in the to number of members - to include 15
regional and 69 open electorate members - creating an 84 member House of Assembly.

48 The Papua and New Guinea Act 1949-1950 provided for a Legislative Council to be

appointed by the Administrator, comprising a total of 29 members namely (a)
Administrator; (b) 16 official members; (c) 3 non-official qualified elected members as
specified under ordinance; (d) 3 non-official members representing the Christian churches
within the Territory; (e) 3 non-official native members; and (f) 3 other non-official
members.
49 Ibid: 179.
50 Papua and New Guinea House ofAssembly Debates, July 1973.
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Though the establishment and the development of political parties had been discouraged
by the colonial Administration, six political parties contested the 1968 elections.
these parties, Pangu Pati led by Michael Somare, was the most important.

Of

John Guise

was elected by this House as the first indigene speaker.
Between the 1968 and the 1972 general elections, the most contentious issue
debated in the Territory related to the timing of self-government and eventual political
independence.

There were differences over timing between the lowland, coastal and

island members on the one hand and highlanders on the other.

The first groups'

(lowland, coastal and islanders) views ranged from support for immediate selfgovernment to self-government by 1980, whilst the Highlanders, represented by the
United Party which included expatriate business (plantations) interests wanted to delay
self-government inde:finitely51 . The major reason for delaying self-government given by
the Highlanders (elucidiated by such Highland Parliamentarians as Anton Parao) was
because of the fear of dominance by better educated coastal and island elite52 . Despite
their protestations, a new flag was adopted in 1971 and, following the Constitutional
Development Committee's Report, the name of Papua and New Guinea was changed to
Papua New Guinea with the amendment of the Papua and New Guinea Act.1949-1950 in
1973.

In Australia also, lines were drawn between the Labor Opposition and the
Liberal-Country Party coalition Government.

The Labor leader, Gough Whitlam, in his

visit to the Territory in 1969 announced the dates for self-government and independence
as 1972 and 1976 if the Labor Party won the next Australian elections.

51 J. Waiko, A Short History .. ., 1993: 180.
52 Papua and New Guinea House ofAssembly Debates,

1972: 587.
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Third House ofAssembly Elections, 1972

During the 1972 general elections a total of 611 candidates contested the various
seats - 553 for open electorates and 58 for regional seats5 3 .

The three major parties

contesting the elections were Pangu Pati, United Party and the People's Progress Party.
After the elections, a coalition government was formed with Pangu and the People's
Progress Party as the senior partners.

Since the coalition favoured early self-

government, one of its first duties was to set the dates and timetable.

After a vote54 in

the Assembly, December 1973 was set as the date for self-government.
After the Labor Party won the Australian general elections in 1972, the Labor
Government proposed political independence for PNG in two years time.

The PNG

Chief Minister, Michael Somare insisted PNG should be responsible for setting the
independence date.

But independence was delayed because firstly, there was

disagreement within the Coalition Government over the timing of independence.
Secondly, the delaying arose from the disagreement between the members of the
Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) formed in 1972 to prepare a "home grown"
constitution and the Somare Government.

The CPC "was set the objective of

recommending a constitution for full self-government with a view to eventual
independence"55 _ Somare wanted independence in 1974, but the CPC disagreed saying
independence should only be attained after the completion of their final report. By July
1973, a Joint Communique by Michael Somare and the External Territories Minister of

Australia stated that December 1973 would be the date for formal self-government and
February 1974 was designated as the date for the final CPC report and draft constitution

53 J. Waiko, A Short History ... , 1993: 182.

54 The vote results were along regional lines. Of the 52 who voted "yes" were Islands
The "no" vote comprised Islands 2;
13; Momase 20; Papua 12; and Highlands 7.
Momase 6; Papua 3 and Highlands 23 . Abstentions were Islands 2; Momase 2; Papua 3;
and Highlands 6 (J. Waiko, A Short History of PNG, Melbourne: Oxford University

Press, 1993: 183).
55 Papua and New Guinea House ofAssembly Debates, September 1973.
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which was to be adopted in April 1974 by a special session of Parliament 56 .

In the

September 1973 House of Assembly sitting, a compromise date was set for the
introduction of the "home grown" constitution around May/June 1974 to complete the
self-government process57 . The constitution was adopted on 15th August 1975, almost
a year after the comprise dates of May/June 1974. In spite of the above disagreements,
16 September 1975 was chosen months earlier as the date for the independence of PNG.

EST ABLISITh1ENT OF THE PNG FOREIGN OFFICE

In conjunction with socio-economic and political developments, Australia also set
in motion a train of events that led to the establishment of a foreign office.

Preparing

former colonies like PNG for eventual political independence was no easy task.
Difficulties arose from disagreement over the questions of what is and what is not
preparation and how much is required for reasonable skills of governance to be
transferred.

The length of time required to obtain maximum outcomes from the

(preparation) process are difficult to determine.

These difficulties were further

compounded by the inability of the colonising power to set a clear timetable (such as an
independence date) for the transfer of political power to the colony.
Preparation implies a rationally planned process of movement through a number
of stages toward an objective of higher level of development, though preparation can
also be viewed as a process to establish and attain independence by instilling efficiency.
Bernard Schaffer has argued that British Governments interpreted their trusteeship
as a preparation for efficiency or viability as much as for independence
and that the two ends can be contradictory58 .
Further still, according to British usage,

56 Papua and New
57 Papua and New

Guinea House ofAssembly Debates, July 1973.
Guinea House of Assembly Debates, September 1973.
58 B. B. Schaffer, "The concept of preparation: some questions about the transfer of
systems of government", World Politics, vol. 18 no. 1, 1965: 49.
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preparation is concerned with the creation and translation of
institutions and transfer of power toward eventual independence59.
Preparation in practice however, does not normally include the creation and
establishment of institutions which differ from institutions found in the coloniser's home
government - in fact preparation usually involves a transfer or copying of institutions.
Institutions (both socio-political and economic) established in former colonial territories
do not generally differ at all markedly from institutions found in the colonising country.
The "creation" is basically a translation and transfer of institutions known to the
colonising power - in other words, institutions transferred are only those the coloniser is
familiar with.

Hence, in British usage, preparation only concerns transfer of existing

institutions and not their creation.
The preparation of Papua and New Guinea was not as purposefully planned as it
might have been because the timetable for political independence was not clear until
1972/73.

Preparation was concerned more with translation and transfer of institutions

than with the creation of institutions suitable to the societal structures of PNG (a process
familiar with British colonisation).

This was contrary to what External Terrotories

Minister Barnes had said in 1965, that the basic purpose of Australia's work in the
Territory was the creation of free institutions on a lasting basis60 .

Loosely translated,

what he meant was that, what was good for Australia was good for PNG61 .
Did preparation extend to the establishment of a foreign office?

Peter Boyce in

his "Preparing a foreign office for Papua-New Guinea" which appeared in the Australian

Journal of Public Administration in 1973 shows how preparation for the establishment
of a PNG foreign office occurred. He shows that preparing a
foreign affairs machinery presupposes a vision of what constitutes an
efficient or viable foreign policy for the new state .... Preparation must

59 Ibid
60
Barnes, "Report of IBRD Mission on the economic development of Papua and

c.

New Guinea", statement tabled in the House of Representatives on Wednesday, 5th May
1965: 10.
61 R. Ward and J. Ballard, "In their own image: Australia's impact on PNG and lessons
for future aid", Australian Outlook, vol. 30 no. 3, 1976: 441.
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include the intellectual and administrative capacity to understand and
select foreign policy alternatives62 .
Preparation for the establishment of a foreign office involved the transfer of
institutions but also the recruitment of well educated and trained personnel to staff the
foreign office. Well educated and trained staff leads to improved understanding of the
international political environment and its implications for domestic politics.

This

eventually makes it more likely that foreign policy decisions will be made in accordance
with national interests.
Peter Boyce identifies the steps required in preparing for the creation of a foreign
office as including
(a) early decision by the coloniser on the date of transfer of power; (b)
creation of a foreign office division or branch within the Prime
Minister's department; (c) recruitment of personnel; (d) provision of
training overseas; (e) early designation of Foreign Minister and
overseas travel by politicians; and (f) setting of guidelines for future
foreign policy direction63 .
By 1972, PNG did set a general timeframe for independence, which was to be at
least after 1 year of self-government, that is, after 1973 .
Even before the dates were set for self-government and eventual independence,
an International Affairs Branch was established in the Department of the Administrator in
1971, headed by an Australian Foreign Affairs official on secondment.

By 1973, the

branch had five locally based expatriates and one indigene (protocol), with twelve
indigenes undergoing training which included attachments to Australian embassies and
high commissions.

In 1972, a Department of Foreign Relations and Trade was

established headed by Minister John Poe.

After Poe's appointment as Minister of

Foreign Relations and Trade, the department was restructured in that Foreign Relations
and Defence were brought under the one Ministry (Ministry of Defence and Foreign
Affairs) under Sir Albert Maori Kiki

62 P. Boyce, "Preparing a foreign office for Papua-New Guinea", Australian Journal of
Public Administration, vol. 32 no. 4, 1973 : 339.
63 Jbid
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There were ministerial tours of countries beginning in 1973 - Sir Maori Kiki
visited Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Singapore and New Zealand whilst other cabinet
members visited other countries and almost all members had visited Australia.
In July 1973, the Chief Minister Michael Somare, in a press conference in
Melbourne announced that
independent P-NG would be a neutralist power, a member of the
Commonwealth and, if possible, a bridge between South East Asia and
the Pacific. She would .. .expect to become a member of the South
Pacific Forum. P-NG would not be interested in a formal defence
treaty with any power64.
The above announcement by Michael Somare highlighted PNG's priority in
opening foreign missions in Jakarta, New York, Canberra, Tokyo, London and Brussels.
It seems clear from the above that preparation for the establishment of a foreign
office in PNG was set in motion well before eventual independence in 1975.

It is

evident that Australia did make attempts to develop for PNG a foreign office,
independent enough to pursue PNG's national interests confidently abroad.

CONCLUSION

Developments in PNG were given impetus by the United Nations Visiting
Mission of 1962 and the 1963 World Bank reports respectively.

Without these two

reports, the preparation of PNG for political independence from Australia would not
have occurred as soon as it did, as the colonial policy had precisely been gradualist.
The preparation process included policies such as economic development for
indigenous self-sufficiency, the establishment of a foreign office, political development,
education and manpower training. Though, retrospectively, the developments were too
little too late, Australia did attempt to foster independence for PNG, which was the basis
upon which foreign policy making in, by and for PNG began.

64 Ibid : 343.

CHAPTER2

AUSTRALIA-PNG RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF PNG's FOREIGN
POLICY

In this chapter I shall be discussing Australia-PNG relations in the overall context
of PNG's foreign policy.

PNG's foreign policy has consistently emphasised relations

with Australia as of utmost importance to PNG, because Australia has been, and still
remains, a major source of economic aid, imported consumer goods and investment
capital. Australia and PNG also share long-standing ties, a common border and security
interests augmented by the presence of skilled Australian personnel in PNG and
educational links. My intention in this chapter is to attempt to identify whether foreign
policy per se or the continuing diversification of PNG's relations away from Australia is
responsible for the emergence of PNG's policy independence in its bilateral relations with
Australia.

FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL INTERESTS

Inter-state relations are directed by states (in this case, Australia and PNG)
toward the pursuit and eventual attainment of (their) national interests either by cooperation or through competition.

The lack of internal self-sufficiency necessarily leads

to the pursuit of these (national) interests externally.

Each country's national interests

are pursued through it's foreign policy1.

1 M. Smith, R. Little and M. Shackleton (eds.), Perspectives on World Politics, London:

Croom Helm, 1981: 15.
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National Interests

The concept national interest is very contentious, shrouded with ambiguity,
defying any adequate, globally acceptable definition.

Difficulties also abound in

identifying a common set of national interests amongst the various competing political
and interest groups within a given democratic state.

In an authoritarian regime, the

competition evident in democracies is, by definition, severely limited or does not exist,
but can nevertheless be competing perspectives amongst the ruling elite vying for
translation into what might be called national interests. Competition in identifying what
constitutes national interest in a democratic state is made easier by the fact that
democratically elected representatives who form the government take the responsibility
for defining such interests in their capacities as representatives of their electorate.
National interests ·can be divided into several categories.

They are military-

strategic, commercial and trade, the protection of independent statehood (territorial
integrity and sovereignty) and economic well-being2 .

For some countries, ethnic

conflict (former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia, etc .. .), and the breakdown in law and
order resulting from economic ills (as in contemporary PNG) which can lead to internal
political instability, are major difficulties. Whilst for other states a military confrontation
would be of immediate concern (South Korea versus North Korea).

The prospect of

becoming submerged as water level rises as a result of global warming is a threat to the
national interests of the low lying island atolls in the Pacific.

From these examples, it

can be said that national interests relate to factors which either enhance or reduce an
independent state's ability to survive, and thus demand immediate attention followed by
appropriate action.

2 F. Green, Dynamics of International Relations: Power, Security and Order, New

York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964: 37-51 ; W. Hanrieder, "Dissolving international
politics: reflections on a nation-state", M. Smith et. al., Perspectives on World Politics ...,

1981: 140; H. Morgenthau, "Another great debate': the national interest of the US", M.
Smith et. al., Perspectives on World Politics ... , 1981: 47.
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Notwithstanding the preceding categorisation, national interests do not remain
constant in importance and priority because circumstances and those in positions to
define national interests change.

For example, in times of conflict between states, a

direct military confrontation would be perceived to be of immediate concern to the
stability and independence of the state, therefore acquiring the status as the most
important national interest at that point of heightened conflict.

But, if a military threat

wanes or loses credibility because the source of the threat has diminished and or
disappeared, it is likely to be eventually downgraded to a lower priority. Other issues
may emerge as immediate priorities, a consequence brought about by the altered nature
of the source of threat to the survival of the state. Evidently, then, national interests are
those which are deemed by governments to be important factors in enhancing the
chances of the state's ability to survive and maintain its sovereignty, territorial integrity
and statehood as well as its capability in providing public welfare services.

Particular

national interests acquire priority because their attainment or lack thereof may improve
or threaten the existence of an independent state or even destroy the culture (as religion
has sometimes done), societal structures (the introduction of new forms of social
organisations) and the economy (establishment of new modes of production and labour
relations).
In line with the categories discussed in the foregoing paragraph, Evans and Grant

have identified Australia's national interests as being significantly concerned with external
factors, such as geopolitical or strategic, economic and trade factors, and the national
interest in being, and being seen to be, a good international citizen3 . PNG's perceptions
of PNG's national interests are more internal and inward looking, namely the
maintenance of a unified PNG by guarding against potential political disintegration into
many smaller societies.

Thus, for PNG, security perceptions concieved solely in

conventional military terms are marginal when compared with the need to defuse

3 G. Evans and B. Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s,

Melbourne: Melbourne University Press (Paperback edn.), 1992: 33-35.
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internal, non-military threats. Hence, inter-ethnic tensions, law and order and resource
oriented disputes have become the primary security concerns for PNG, reflecting the
definition of security (in non-military terms) as defined by Pacific island states4.
Consequently, policies pursued by PNG will normally diverge from Australia's because
the terms in which threats - and interests - are defined and protected/furthered reflect
different national origins.

It is, therefore, a natural progression that diverging policy

instruments will bestow a certain degree of policy independence on PNG's conduct of
bilateral relations with Australia.

Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is to an extent the pnmary activity of independent states5.
However, non-state actors' (the Red Cross, the United Nations, political parties,
multinational companies, etc, ... ) also engage m activities externally across state
boundaries, which do not involve state to state interactions.
Foreign policy, like domestic policy, advances, protects, attains and consistently
maintains a state's national interest(s), which are generally identified as sovereignty and
independence, economic well-being, cultural and territorial integrity against external

4 See for example Peter King, "Redefining South Pacific security: greening and
domestication", in R. Thakur (ed.), The Sauth Pacific: Problems, Issues and Prospects,
London: Macmillan, 1990 discusses the re-definition of security in the South Pacific as
become more domestic and environment related. See also a discussion by Anthony
Siaguru, "Small 's' security for small states", in D. Hegarty and P. Polomka (eds.), The
Security of Oceania in the 1990s vol. 1: Views from the Region, SDSC-RSPacS, ANU,
1989 in which he argues that security for small states comprises for military and nonmilitary threats. The PNG Government's Security for Development: Integrating the
Government's response to The National Summit on Crime into a Comprehensive and
Planned Approach to Law and Order, PNG Government Paper 1991 is concerned with
security issues which are not military oriented but with non-military threats such as law
and order.
5 P. Reynolds, Introduction to International Relations, (2nd. edn.), London: Longman,
1970: 13-15; 36.
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encroachments6 or other interests such as interests of foreign business cronies: all are
important factors because they determine the status of a state in relation to other states
within the global community .

Status less than political independence, established and

accepted as such under international law, inhibits the conduct of formal interactions with
other states as equals (for example, Taiwan).

Political independence alone does not

guarantee that all interactions between independent states are based upon equality - some
are stronger than others, commensurate with the availability of resources at their disposal
even though, according to international law, all states, both small and the powerful, are
equal.

The availability of resources means that some states may have more power than

others, which is then translated into a degree of independence and initiative in foreign
policy or dependency and a reactive approach to foreign policy.

But the notion of

sovereignty suggests "the idea that there is a final and absolute authority in the political
community" in relation to a state means that there is "no final and absolute authority
exist[ing] elsewhere• 0 .

Sovereignty then bestows upon an independent state (big or

small) the authority to pursue independent external policy.

Independence, however, is

constrained for all formally independent states by the nature of the interdependent
relations that have become prevalent as a consequence of all countries' inability to
provide sufficiently on their own for their national needs.
National interests such as political independence, economic well-being, military
preparedness, imperialism, etc ..., the objectives of foreign policy, however, are never
pursued uniformly by each competing state.

Some newly independent states regard the

retaining of ties with former colonisers as unacceptable (for example, Guinea and France
after independence), while others maintain such ties in a variety of forms as a matter of
necessity, a decision prompted by economic realities8 .

The choice between political

independence and lack of economic independence (the inability to finance development

6 F. Green, Dynamics of International Relations ... , 1964: 37-51; H. Morgenthau,

"Another great debate .. .", op. cit., 1981: 47.
7 F. Hinsley cited by D. Held, Political Theory and the Modem State, London: Polity
Press, 1989: 215.
8 See A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration ..., 1962: chapter 5.
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projects and programs domestically) is a major reason for British Caribbean colonies'
vigorous arguments for remaining British dependencies rather than acceding to political
independence9 . Even under limited forms of decolonisation, countries continue to seek
to be independent of the major powers, but this wish is unrealistic because foreign policy
and defence matters remain the responsibility of the major (former colonial) power.

CONSTRAINTS ON PNG's FOREIGN POLICY
The conduct of PNG's bilateral relations with Australia are constrained by several
important factors, some of which are common while others are not.

Firstly, Australia

and PNG share a common history - one a coloniser and the other the colonised.

Their

common history has meant, that over the years of interaction, certain interests have
become coincident, for example, an interest in investment security. · Investment from
Australia could be negatively affected by increasing lawlessness in PNG leading toward
loss of profit for the investor and the host. But history is not the only reason why PNG's
foreign policy gives a significant emphasis to Australia-PNG relations. Elsewhere, there
has been conflict between former colonies and colonisers in the post-colonial period, for
example between Guinea and France. Secondly, both Australia and PNG share common
military-strategic concerns as a result of their geographical proximity.

The close

proximity leads to a high Australian security interest 10 . More significantly, PNG is and
has been an important factor in Australia's own military-strategic calculationsl 1.
However, common military-strategic interests are no longer as important as they were
during the Cold War because of changes in the regional military and political situation.
For example, the current Keating Government's look north policy, which resembles the

9

J. Connell, "Britain's Caribbean colonies: the end of the era of decolonisation", Journal

of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol. 32 no. 1, 1994.
10 G. Evans and B. Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations ..., 1992: 103.
11 Australia's regional security, a Ministerial statement by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and Trade Gareth Evans to the Australian Federal Parliament in 1989,
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Annual Report 1989190: Canberra: AGPS,
1990: 62 ; JCF ADT, Australia's Relations with PNG, Canberra: AGPS, 1991: 157; 170.
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policy the PNG Government has also been pursuing for some time, looks at developing
wide ranging relations with countries of South East and North East Asia.
substantial Australian economic interests in PNG are another important factor.

Thirdly,
These

economic interests are vulnerable to actions arising from nationalistic aspirations in PNG,
occasionally degenerating into inter- and intra-tribal conflict or landowners versus the
national government, threatening future investment in PNG.

Conflicts are usually a

consequence of landowners' desires for greater access to participation in and equity in
the benefits arising from the development and exploitation of PNG's natural resources
(particularly in the mining and forestry sectors) 12. Fourthly, PNG is a major beneficiary
of Australia's overseas aid and if that aid were changed too fast or withdrawn suddenly,
development would be adversely affected 13 .

The material benefits and the living

standards of the population could not be consistently and continuously sustained by the
PNG Government at current levels without Australian support.

Fifthly, PNG is

substantially dependent upon Australia for its overall national development and national
cohesion14. In a House of Assembly debate in 1974, it was confirmed that Australia's aid
support assurance to PNG [was] directed toward a united PNG 15 . National cohesion at
independence meant retaining PNG as a single state rather than allowing it to disintegrate
into a collection of small states, though this did not deter the North Solomons Province
from unilaterally declaring independence from PNG in 1975. The condition attached to
continuing Australian support was that PNG should remain unified.

Thus, if PNG

disintegrated into smaller units, Australia would cease its support. It is therefore correct
to make a case that continuing injection of Australian development aid, capital

p. Eaton, "The plantation redistribution scheme in PNG", A. Sawyerr (ed.), Economic
Development and Trade ... , 1984; BPNG, QEB, December 1990: 6; T. Sykes, "Contract
conflict in PNG", The Bulletin, 15th December 1992: 70; B. Gomez, "Wingti's explosive
cocktail threatens foreign miners", The Weekend Australian, December 5th-6th 1992:
12

31.
AIDAB, Australia's Development Co-operation with PNG, a supplementary
submission to the JCFADT inquiry into Australia's relations with PNG, IDI no. 9,
Canberra: AGPS, 1990: 2.
14 Ibid
15 Papua and New Guinea House ofAssembly Debates, 1974.
13
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investments to exploit and develop natural resources and security has contributed to the
continued maintenance of a unified PNG.

Sixthly, the financial and skilled manpower

resources available to the PNG Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade are significantly
limited, minimising the range of options and activities (diplomatic and political) it can
PNG is thus forced to be selective in the types of

undertake and pursue successfully.

activities and objectives it is able to pursue as priority and in which countries to establish
resident diplomatic missions.

The lack of resources means PNG foregoes the

establishment of diplomatic missions in most countries, but still does maintain diplomatic

~lations with those not hosting PN&"s-aiplOmatic ·missions oy other foriils -of diplomatic
representations.

Seventhly, Australia-PNG relations impact on relations between each

of the two countries and Indonesia.

For example, in a leaked document in 1984 the

Australian Government encouraged PNG to take action wherever possible to suppress
anti-Indonesian activity in the border region, a proposal of which the then Foreign
Minister, Rabbie Namaliu disapproved. Minister Namaliu stressed that PNG would not
accept any foreign government involving PNG in their own disputes, and criticised
Australia for meddling in PNG's domestic affairs 16 .

Finally, the Australian media has

been responsible for diplomatic altercations between Australia and PNG. For example,
Australian journalists have flouted PNG's laws, exemplified by the ABC journalists'
interview of OPM members in PNG in 1984 17 .

The media sought to justify the non-

compliance of foreign journalists with PNG laws by reference to the media's right to
freedom of information and the obligation to disseminate news and information including in this case the right to violate sovereign state laws.

The PNG Government

reacted with expulsions and the revocation of entry and work permits, for example, in
relation to the resident ABC journalist Sean Dorney in the same year 18 .

Though the

damage to the relationship between Australia and PNG generated by the media is

R. May, "East of the border: Irian Jaya and the border in PNG's domestic and foreign
politics", R. May (ed.), Between Two Nations, NSW: Robert Brown and Associates
(Australia Pty. Ltd.), 1986: 118.
17 S. Dorney, PNG: People, Politics and History ... , 1990: 1-2.
16

18 Ibid
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minimal, the media's impact on the relationship cannot be discounted; the Australian
media's reporting of events and developments in Indonesia and Malaysia has led to
diplomatic rows between Australia on the one hand and Indonesia and Malaysia on the
other.

Incidentally, the common interests and issues discussed above bestows policy

independence upon PNG, because both countries' interests coincide.

Moreover, the

potential for PNG to compromise and/or sacrifice its policy independence in order to
maintain and placate Australian displeasure exists. I suspect that policy independence is
tolerated and maintained by the major power (in this case Australia), only as long as the
relationship does not jeopardise the great power's regional and global objectives.
The development of an independent PNG foreign policy with regard to Australia
is dependent upon the degree to which the constraints discussed above are overcome.
More money, more skilled personnel, less interference by Australia in PNG's policy
direction and more sensitive Australian media will lead to a situation whereby PNG's
relations with Australia will become more independent.

PNG's FOREIGN POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA

PNG has enunciated two fundamental foreign policy approaches smce
independence.

The first approach, "universalism", was embodied in a series of

statements between 1973 and 1975 made by the Chief Minister (and eventual Prime
Minister) Mr. Michael Somare and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,
Sir Albert Maori Kiki.

The universalist approach will be considered as Phase I

beginning in 1975 and ending in 1981.

The second approach "active and selective

engagement" is considered as Phase II.

The latter approach is embodied in a White

Paper which was tabled in the PNG National Parliament by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and Trade in 1981, and has been re-endorsed up to the present by every incoming
government.

This section will consider the two foreign policy approaches, their

differences and similarities if any, and discuss their place in the continuing development
of bilateral relations between Australia and PNG.
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Phase I: Universalism, 1975-1981

At independence, PNG's pioneer foreign policy direction was defined as
"universalism".

Universalism, implied PNG extending good neighbourliness and

friendship to all countries without discriminating between various creeds, ideologies or
forms of governments - being simply "friends to all and enemies to none 1119 with the
exception of racist regimes such as Rhodesia and South Africa.

To achieve this

objective, PNG pursued a strategy of establishing formal diplomatic relations with as
many countries as possible - countries of liberal democratic and state socialist
orientations.

Establishing diplomatic relations was made cheaper,

and hence more

realistic, through multiaccreditation, consular offices, appointment of honorary counsels
and membership in international organisations (regional, global and commodity based)20.
As the establishment of resident diplomatic missions was financially expensive, they were

consequently only established in states of great importance to PNG's socio-economic,
political and security development.

The significant determinants in the establishment of

diplomatic missions abroad were, firstly, PNG's political orientations, which were
. singularly pro-western, as a result of its colonial past, and, secondly, the need to
minimise costs, and, thirdly, the realisation that not all states' national interests
significantly impacted upon PNG's, which meant that permanent foreign mtss1ons
were/are not required.

The same reasons have also inhibited other countries from

establishing diplomatic missions in PNG (though they often maintain formal diplomatic
relations).
In spite of the internationalist intent of universalism, the policy explicitly
emphasised the priority of relations with PNG's traditional partners: Australia, the South

19 AFAR, "PNG an emerging foreign policy", vol. 46 no. 6, 1975: 315; J. Chan, "PNG",

a text of an address presented at the opening of the PNG High Commission in Canberra
on 20 April 1981, AFAR, vol. 52 no. 5, 1981: 246.
20

P. Boyce, Foreign Affairs in New States: Some Questions of Credentials,

Queensland: Queensland University Press, 1973: chapter 5.
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Pacific, South East Asia and Western Europe2 1.

The special status conferred upon

Australia, the South Pacific, South East Asia and Western Europe was based upon the
fact that they were PNG's major sources of ODA (Australia), trade and commerce
(Australia, Western Europe and Japan), investment (Australia and Japan), security
(Australia and Indonesia) and proximity (Australia and South East Asia) and cultural
identity (South Pacific).

PNG's western orientation was shown in the first years of

independence with the opening of resident diplomatic missions in Canberra, London,
Washington, New York, Brussels, Tokyo, Wellington and Djakarta.

These were

necessary because PNG's commodity markets and sources of aid were located in the
West particularly in Australia, Japan and the EEC. The Djakarta mission was essential
because of the shared international border and potential threat to both countries' internal
security arising from the activities of the Organisasi Papua Mederka (OPM) along the
border. OPM fighters cross the border into PNG to get away from Indonesian military
pursuit, which has led to occasional clashes between Indonesia and PNG military patrols.
Approaches for the establishment of resident diplomatic missions in Port Moresby from
China and the former USSR were politely turned down until 1980, when a Chinese
mission was established in Port Moresby. The basic explanation in refusing to accept
Chinese and USSR embassies in PNG was because the Australian (Commonwealth)
Government and its security organisations advised PNG against hosting resident
diplomatic missions of both China and USSR.

The major argument was that the PNG

Government and its security agencies were incapable of monitoring the activities of
China and USSR missions.
Universalism was also intended to establish PNG's position within the then
bipolar world by implicitly proposing a middle path between the two competing power
blocs (West and East), implying that "we (PNG) [did] not want our friends to choose our
enemies

for us" 22 .

Universalism expressed PNG's determination to remain non-

M. Kiki, "PNG: an assessment report on foreign policy", AFAR, vol. 46 no. 6, 1975:
321.
22 M. Somare cited in G. Goodman and F. Moos (ed.), 1he US, Japan in the Western
21
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committal to neither side: a decision very much driven by an implicit assumption that this
stance would help PNG to draw economic, political and security benefits from both sides
of the divide, but was unsuccessful because nothing was done to develop relations with
the US SR.

Consequently, the middle path was never effective in drawing economic

benefits because, PNG by its geographical location, was not of strategic importance to
any maJor powers.
Universalism bestowed upon PNG a certain degree of neutrality which helped it
to explain why it would not allow itself to be sucked into the potentially explosive power
rivalry and ideological struggle between the two opposing blocs by signing any military
agreements or alliances23 , though PNG had no real choice because there was no option no one wanted to enter into any sort of security treaty with PNG.

It may be correct to

suggest that Australia's reluctance to enter into formal military alliance with PNG had
influenced the PNG Minister for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade to strong opposition
to a military treaty with Australia at independence.

The salient imperative from PNG's

perspective was to establish a framework in which PNG could attempt to take an
independent foreign policy line without being labelled either as socialist or communist by
its former coloniser and other pro-western and anti-Communist states in the region, and
to allay socialist/communist states' sceptical view of PNG as a western stooge or lackey.
The lack of resources (financial, personnel and know-how) of the PNG Foreign
Affairs and Trade Department dictated that PNG could establish resident missions only in
countries and regions of significance determined by economics, trade and security, or in
the case of the Fiji mission due to close ethnic identity and as the headquarters of
regional organisations like the SPEC 24, and, in the case of the United Nations, PNG's
desire to co-operate with other countries to promote peace, security and international

Pacific: Micronesia and PNG, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981: 139.
23 M. Kiki, "PNG: an assessment report ... ", 1975: 321.
24 M . Kiki, "An assessment report on foreign policy by the Minister for Defence, Foreign
Relations and Trade to the House of Assembly on 6th December 1974, Universalism:
Guidelines to the Foreign Policy of PNG, Department of Defence, Foreign Affairs and
Trade, 1974: 24.
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justice25, or simply to ensure PNG's interests were not overlooked there.

It is also

possible that universalism was intentionally defined broadly by the leaders of PNG to
send a message to the world that PNG's independence did not depend upon Australia's
own economic, political and military-strategic interests, but that PNG was willing to
break away from its historical place in the western orbit and to search elsewhere for
support in the pursuit of its development and security objectives26 .
The restraints on PNG's external relations originating from Australian (and
western) economic and military-strategic interests, PNG's own resource limitations and
traditional and immediate regional concerns meant that relations with other countries in
other regions were not thouroughly pursued.
As the first five years of independence came to a close and the inadequacies of
universalism became apparent, a government committee was set up in 1979 to search for
a new policy direction. The Foreign Minister tabled in the PNG National Parliament a
new foreign policy direction in November 1981 to guide PNG into the 80s and beyond.

Phase II: Active and Selective Engagement, 1981 and since Re-endorsed

The second Government Foreign Policy approach was tabled in Parliament in
November 1981.
predecessor.

The new foreign policy in every respect was less ambitious than its

The new direction was defined as "active and selective engagement".

The principles incorporated within active and selective engagement consolidated and
continued the practice under universalism, that is, a continued emphasis placed upon
relations with Australia, South Pacific, Western Europe, South East Asia and Japan.

25

M. Somare, "The emerging role of PNG in world Affairs", AFAR, vol. 45 no. 7, 1974:

12.

M . Turner, PNG: The Challenge of Independence, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1990:
148~ 151.

26
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However, it must be noted that active and selective engagement was not meant
to be a foreign policy per se, but was intended (many of its proposals and
recommendations) as a general guide for future planning as resources became
available27 . It was an approach flexible enough to accommodate the continuing changes
in government and various foreign policy preferences of future foreign ministers.

Active

and selective engagement was not a rigid, inflexible policy.
Active and selective engagement was premised upon the fact that the relations
PNG pursued should be of benefit to the country and its citizens, (and so was
universalism).

In other words, it chose the approach for the PNG Government to

acknowledge that diplomatic relations with certain countries and regions could not be
considered priority unless their potential to impact upon or to advance PNG's own
interests were considerable.
To give substance to the development of relations with countries that shared
common interests with PNG a broad three-pronged diplomatic strategy was devised:
a) consolidation and extension of existing relations; b) independent and
constructive co-operation with the governments of neighbouring
countries; and c) further diversification and development of relations
with the governments of other countries with which we [PNG] share[s]
significant interests, and of countries with a substantial capacity to
affect our
interests28 .

Consolidation and Extension of Existing Relations

The first element of the three-pronged diplomatic strategy was concerned with
rounding out the aspects of formal diplomacy - by filling gaps,
extending contacts and making existing contacts more ,effective, then
going on to deal with those relationships with other countries which
have developed beyond their formal beginnings29.

27 PNGFAR, "Foreign policy: PNG", vol. I no. 4, 1982 (special issue): 9

28 Ibid : 20.

29 Ibid: 24.
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Consolidation and extension of relations was to be pursued by establishing formal
diplomatic relations with those countries where substantial contact - formal and informal
exists.

The consolidation and extension of existing relations covered not only those

countries which did not have PNG diplomatic missions located in their capitals, but also
those which did. Regional emphasis was centred in the Pacific and South East Asia. In
the South Pacific, PNG did not have any formal relations with Nauru, Tonga, Western
Samoa and Federated States of Micronesia. The Federated States of Micronesia are still
part of the Trust Territories of Pacific Islands (TTPI) - so not eligible for full, formal
relations.

PNG's relations with these states were conducted through regional

organisations such as the South Pacific Commission (SPC) and South Pacific Forum
(SPF) and the diplomatic missions in Fiji and Solomon Islands.

PNG's relations with

Indonesia were conducted through a formal diplomatic mission whilst relations with
other South East Asian countries were pursued through ASEAN.
Economic interests were to be pursued with countries that produced
commodities similar to those produced by PNG - copper (Peru, Zambia and Zaire),
coffee (Brazil, Colombia, Ivory Coast, Uganda and El Salvador) and cocoa (Ghana,
Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Brazil, Cameroon, Sao Tome and Principe).
done bilaterally with many of these countries.

But nothing was

Nevertheless, PNG pursued relations

both informally and formally through regional (ASEAN, ACP, SPC and SPF), global
(UN and World Bank) and specific commodity (related) organisations such as the
International

Cocoa

Organisation,

International

Coffee

Organisation

and

the

International Council of Copper Exporting Countries (from which PNG has since
withdrawn).

Independent and Constructive Neighbourly Co-operation

The independent and constructive neighbourly co-operation aspect of the three-

pronged diplomatic strategy is concerned with PNG's immediate neighbours - Australia,
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Indonesia, Solomon Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM).

The

relations with these neighbouring countries are of primary concern to PNG as each have
involved PNG in "detailed negotiations over the definition of our national boundaries and
arrangements for boundary crossers 1130. But these relations are not confined to common
borders only, the relations include commercial, cultural, educational, aid and securitystrategic issues too.

The cultural, political, economic and military-strategic diversity of

neighbouring countries implies that the cultivation and development of relations will also
differ from case to case.

( 1) Australia

The diversification of PNG's external relations to a certain extent has tended to
make the relationship between Australia and PNG become relatively, but not absolutely,
less important to PNG, but with exceptions by mutual agreement in certain areas such as
aid relations3 I _ It is however, more important now to maintain and consolidate relations
with Australia because diversification has been viewed in Australia as an excuse by which
Australian aid commitment can be decreased.

In light of this sentiment, if PNG should

make approaches to other potential donors, these approaches should be made on the
understanding that priority to existing relations should be maintained because other
donors' terms and conditions tend to be less liberal than Australian aid.
Several Agreements32 have been reached between the two countries covering
areas of mutual concern such as trade, security, investment, taxation, aviation,
extradition, education and training and aid. A border treaty covering the Torres Straits
outlining the sovereignty and maritime boundaries between the two countries was
negotiated in 1978 which came into force 7 years later on the 15th of February, 1985.

30 Ibid: 40.
3! Ibid.: 39.
32 The term "Agreement" is used here to include arrangements, memorandams of

understanding, joint statements and treaties, even though all these varying agreements
have differing levels of legality, based upon political arrangements and agreements.
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The treaty sets out sovereignty over islands and territorial seas, guidelines for resource
exploitation (seabed mining and fisheries), navigation, movement and conducting of
traditional border crossers and activities, health, migration and the management of
designated protected areas. The smooth execution of the Treaty is vested in the Torres
Straits Treaty Joint Advisory Committee (Article 19) comprising -

*
*
*
*

2 national representatives from each country
1 Government of Queensland representative
1 Fly River Provincial Government Representative
3 traditional inhabitants

The Advisory Council has alternating chairmanship.
This treaty is responsible for the smooth administration of the border, even
though, there has been very little conflict.

Reports and recommendations of the

Advisory Council are submitted to the Foreign Ministers ofboth countries.

(2) Indonesia

Relations between Indonesia and PNG have developed, both directly and through
PNG's attendance at ASEAN meetings as an observer.

The Basic Agreement.. .on

Border Arrangements was signed in 1973 (and re-negotiated in 1979) between Indonesia
and PNG, followed by the opening of formal diplomatic relations with an exchange of
Ambassadors at independence.

The Basic Agreement.. .on Border Arrangements

provides for the relative freedom of movement to "traditional" boundary crossers,
provided that they do not settle permanently on the other side. They
have also agreed to allow free navigation by nationals or citizens of
both countries through the Fly River Bulge, and to consult and cooperate in respect of major natural resource projects, including Ok
Tedi 33 .
The Border Agreement can also be seen as an instrument through and by which
illegal activities (particularly OPM related) can be curtailed and/or controlled.

33

PNGFAR, "Foreign Policy .. .", 1982: 42.

To
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supplement the Border Arrangements, an Agreement concerning Technical Co-operation
was reached in 1979, under which technical exchanges have been conducted. In the
1980s the relationship was further expanded and strengthened beyond border issues by
the signing of a Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Co-operation in 1986, and in
1987 by PNG acceding to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation.

(3)

Solomon Islands

Relations with the Pacific Islands including Solomon Islands are pursued and
developed in two ways
(1) through participation in regional gatherings; and (2)
direct government to government dealings34.

through

Bilateral diplomacy (direct government to government contact) has not been
utilised much by Pacific island countries, mainly because of the lack of diplomatic
resources.

Consequently, multilateral diplomacy has had greater importance in PNG's

development, consolidation and maintenance of relations with its Pacific neighbours.
Multilateral diplomacy has been conducted through regional organisations such as the
South Pacific Commission (SPC) and the South Pacific Forum (SPF) and their
subsidiaries.
Relations with the FSM are pursued through multilateral organisations like the
SPC, the SPF and the Forum Fisheries Agency, particularly when dealing with fishery
exploitation within the 200 mile EEZ, and through the accreditation of a roving
ambassador.

34 Ibid : 36.
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Diversification and Development of Relations

The third element of the three-pronged diplomatic strategy was necessitated by
the acknowledgement and acceptance by the PNG Government that PNG was incapable,
even with a modest defence force, of successfully defending the country, in the event of
armed attack35 .

The PNG Government noted that no foreign government had any

designs for military aggression toward PNG.

The only likely threats to PNG were

considered to be governments and political movements which might seek to exploit
opportunities such as those created by the law and order situation and ethnic aspirations
in order to pursue their own interests in PNG. No foreign government has offered to
guarantee the independence and security of PNG3 6 .

In these circumstances,

establishment of relations with countries sharing international boundaries was a necessary
step toward securing a "security umbrella" - with diplomacy vigorously touted as the first
and effective line of defence in the protection of PNG's sovereignty and independence.
The 1981 foreign policy approach indicated the PNG Government's desire to
effectively exploit and manage scarce resources to fully attain for PNG maximum
benefits (whether economic, military-strategic, manpower development, etc, ...). Clearly
identifiable foreign policy objectives restrained PNG from being wasteful in the pursuit of
marginal and nominal relations which were unlikely to improve its well-being
significantly. The effectiveness of the three-pronged diplomatic strategy eventually was
manifested in the selective establishment of new foreign resident missions abroad. There
was pressure exerted upon the Department of Foreign Affairs to be realistic when
planning new foreign missions or formulating foreign policy.

The three-pronged

strategy gave lower priority to less relevant and unimportant issues on the policy agenda.
Since the adoption of active and selective engagement in 1981, minor
adjustments in foreign policy have been made by the various incoming governments.

35 Ibid. : 46.
36 Jbid
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These minor adjustments did not vary much from the overall thrust of active and
selective engagement.

In 1983, during a speech to the 38th United Nations General

Assembly session, then Prime Minister Somare outlined new foreign policy initiatives
under the title "purposeful direction" which insisted upon the premise that, without being
strident or aggressive, we are pushing for progress toward international equity (access to
economic benefits, health, education, good water, food, etc, ... ) and order. Somare in his
speech asserted that order can be achieved in relations between sovereign states and that
an economically and socially equitable world wide order can be attained37 .

This

equitable and ordered world can be achieved through the use of international
organisations like the United Nations.

Five years later in 1988, then Prime Minister

Paias Wingti in a speech to the PNG National Parliament in outlining new foreign policy
directions stressed two important elements as "continuity and change" 38 .

Though

emphasis shifted with every new administration, commitment was maintained in the
pursuit of the three-pronged diplomatic strategy, occasionally requiring adjustments as
outlined above, imposed by the general economic conditions, and the changing domestic
and international political environment.

UNIVERSALISM AND ACTIVE AND SELECTIVE ENGAGE1\1ENT
There was very little if any difference in practice between the two foreign policy
approaches. Active and selective engagement was less ambitious because it did not aspire
to be the answer to all PNG's foreign policy needs.

Active and selective engagement

was practical - its objectives were within reach of PNG's capabilities, as was underlined
by the criteria for selecting priority areas for implementation set down in the threepronged diplomatic strategy.

M. Somare, an address on the 13th of October to the 38th Session of the UN General
Assembly on PNG's approach to its relations with the rest of the world was described as
"Purposeful Direction", PNGFAR, vol. 8 no. 4, 1983: 5.
38 P. Wingti, "Foreign policy of independent commitment to international co-operation",
a major foreign policy statement for the next five years made to the National Parliament
of PNG on his election as the Prime Minister, PNGFAR, vol. 8 no. 1, 1988: 5.
37
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Universalism did not deny the special place of Australia, the South Pacific, South
East Asia, Japan and the EEC in PNG's foreign relations.

The South Pacific, Australia,

South East Asia, Japan and the EEC were given priority in PNG's foreign diplomatic
relations, basically because of the prominence of aid, trade and commerce, security,
history, cultural affinity, education, and skilled and technical manpower recruitment
factors.
Active and selective engagement in many ways laid the foundations for the
diversification of socio-economic, military and aid relations, as defined by independent
and constructive neighbourly co-operation and diversification of PNG's relations, leading
to a relative reduction of economic dependence upon Australia.

As PNG's relations

diversified, bilateral relations with Australia could no longer to be taken for granted by
both parties, resulting in more formal arrangements such as the JDP.

CONCLUSION

The universalism and active and selective engagement foreign policy directions
could be said, firstly, to have helped increase the level of policy independence of PNG in
the areas of politics, economic planning, and particularly in the formulation and
implementation of both domestic and external policy.

This was made possible by the

formalisation of the conduct of the relationship, which also made it more predictable.
Diversification of sources of aid, skilled manpower, trade and investment might be
regarded as a manifestation of growing policy independence rather than the result of
foreign policy direction per se.

I suggest that policy independence is not necessarily a

product of PNG's particular foreign policy direction, but an indication of the success of
PNG's diversification exercise. Active and selective engagement is an expression of the
changes that occured.

CHAPTER3

COMMERCE AND INVESTMENT

This chapter discusses the importance of economics in the bilateral relationship
between Australia and PNG.

The relationship between Australia and PNG has been

described as a dependent one by Amarshi, Good and Mortimer in 1976 and at other
times by other writers too, particularly if the data regarding the level of aid PNG receives
from Australia (for a detailed discussion on Australian aid see chapter 5) is taken into
consideration.

However, even if economic, including aid, suggests the economic

dependence by PNG on Australia, they do not detract from the actual policy
independence that PNG has displayed in its conduct of bilateral relations with Australia.
Nevertheless, the question of how much impact commerce and investment (from and)
with Australia have had on the independence of PNG's bilateral relations with Australia
deserves detailed discussion.

AUSTRALIA AND PNG CO:Ml\!IERCIAL FRAMEWORK

PNG's economy is extremely dependent upon primary production: agriculture,
mining, forestry and fisheries.

The primary sector contributes an average of more than

80 percent of PNG's exports per annum 1. PNG's manfacturing sector has played a very
minor part in PNG's economic development.

It has even been suggested that PNG's

primary sector-dominated economy was structured that way by Australia so that exports
from PNG did not compete but complemented Australia's own economic development2.

Department of Trade and Resources, Survey of Major Western Pacific Economies
1986: 113, 142; H. Thompson, The Forests of PNG: The Dilemma of Development,
Murdoch University Economics Program Working Paper no. 72, 1992: 4.
2 P. Fitzpatrick, Law and State in PNG, London: Academic Press, 1980.
1
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Australia has remained an important trading partner since independence.

Trade

has been consistently in Australia's favour over the period under consideration ( 19801990) (see tables 5 and 6), but during the 1990s, trade has slowly moved toward
equilibrium.

Commercial relations between the two countries are conducted under the

PNG and Australia Trade and Commercial Relations Agreement (PATCRA) first signed
in 1976 and since renegotiated in 1991 and the Joint Declaration Principles (JDP).

Papua New Guinea and Australia Trade and Commrcial Relations Agreement

The Agreement has two important aspects: it firstly incorporates existing trade
relations, and, secondly, sets in place new arrangements for the development and the
conduct of the continuously evolving commercial relations between the two states, by
attempting to establish a "free trade area" 3 .
Prior to PNG's independence in 1975, certain products originating in PNG
enjoyed duty-free entry into Australia under the Customs Tariff (PNG) Act of 19264 .
However, the list covered only unprocessed agricultural and a variety of other primary
products.

The decisions taken by the Australian Government on products for duty-free

entry were decided in such a way that Australia's own domestic agriculture and primary
industries were not disadvantaged5 .

In line with this policy, the Australian

Commonwealth Government encouraged the production of tea and coffee so that it
would become independent of South America and India, but at the same time did not
favour and encourage the production of sugarcane and pineapples as they would
compete with Australia's home industries6 . Gradually over the years, the categories of

3 Artcle 3 ofPATCRA

A. Sawyerr, "Relations of dependence and the PNG-Australia trade agreement", in A.
Sawyerr, D. Weisbrot and A. Paliwala (eds.), Law and Social Change in PNG,
Melbourne: Butterworths Pty. Ltd., 1982: 267.
5 P. Fitzpatrick, Law and State in PNG, London: Academic Press, 1980: 55.
6 C. Snowden, "Copra co-operatives", in D. Denoon and C. Snowden (eds.), A Time to
Plant and a Time to Uproot, Port Moresby: IPNGS, n. d.: 185.
4
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products listed for duty-free entry into Australia were expanded to include non-primary
and non-agricultural products.
PNG did not reciprocate Australia's preferential treatment of its products.

This

non-reciprocity was off-set by PNG's liberal tariff policies7 and also by treating Australia
as a most-favoured-nation (itself a form of preference), resulting in about 70 percent of
Australian products being admitted under very minimal import duties or duty-free8 .
Sawyerr taking up this strain of argument drew attention to the fact that a substantial proportion of trade between the parties has always been
duty- and restriction-free, ranging from 95.2 percent to 99.6 percent
r~garding- PNG exports to Aust1alia; -and--ftom --19:6- -percent to 78-.-5percent in the reverse direction, in the 1974-78 period. But the dutyand restriction-free entry of PNG products into Australia and viceversa were to do with the liberal tariff policy of PNG and her colonial
relations with Australia rather than with any Free Trade Area idea9 .
PATCRA, I shall argue, was put in place to help PNG during the immediate
post-independence period by making available a ready and accessible market for its
products so that PNG would be able to fund domestic socio-economic programs.

And

..

secondly, PATCRA served Australian business interests by preserving Australia's
position as PNG's number one trading partner, 10 particularly as a source of imports.
P ATCRA formalised the entry of unprocessed PNG products duty-free into
Australia. But products that pose some degree of threat and competition to Australian
industries, for example, sugarcane and processed forest products, were unilaterally
subjected to restrictions by Australia.

The results of Australia's protection of its own

domestic producers and industries coincidentally undermined economic development in
PNG 11 .

7 World Bank,

PNG: Selected Development Issues, Washington DC: World Bank, 1982:

49.
8 A. Sawyerr, "Relations of dependence ... ", 1982: 267.
9 Ibid : 268.
10 R . Namaliu, "PNG-Australia relations", PNGFAR, September 1984: 7.
11 P. Fitzpatrick, Law and State in PNG ..., 1980: 5.
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Joint Declaration of Principles

The JDP which was signed in 1987 between Australia and PNG emphasised both
countries' continuing commitment of trade relations and investment. Article 13 (c) that trade between the two countries will be on at least most fovoured
nation tenns and as free of both tariff and other restrictive regulations
of commerce as may be consistent with both countries' domestic
requirements and international commitments 12 .
The JDP echoed that which had been incorporated earlier in other arrangements
such as for example, the P ATCRA.

The JDP changed the way bilateral relations

between Australia and PNG were conducted, that is, all aspects of the relationship,
including commerce and investment would no longer be considered discretely, but as an
integrated whole.

The JDP also relegated the aid aspect of the relationship to the same

level as other aspects: aid was no longer central to the bilateral relationship.

IMPORTS

The total value of PNG's import bill rose from K684.2 million in 1980 to
Kl, 142.9 million in 1990.

Several major product categories dominated PNG's import

bill consistently, and in some instances rose over the last decade (1980 - 1990). Product
categories that dominated the total import share of PNG's market in order of kina value
are machinery and transport equipment, food and meat, chemicals, mineral fuels and
beverages and tobacco.

12 Article 13(c), Joint Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Papua New

Guinea and Australia, signed in 1987.
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Table 5: PNG's Major Categories of Imports (Kina value millions) 13

1

2

133 .2
136.7
138.7
135.4
154.8
153.5
162.7
171.5
181.8
190.9
194.6

8.7
8.4
8.4
8.2
11.2
9.6
8.5
11.9
15.5
15.0
14.8

3

4

5

6

7

Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

117.9
158.0
146.1
167.3
156.3
153 .8
93.4
112.0
98.2
63.7
80:1

36.6
91.6 206.3
684.2
45.0
105.1 215.1
738.1
39.3
118.9
230.4
751.7
60.5
128.5
222.5
821.7
68.2
140.1
243.5
866.8
65.8
132.4
248.4
874.8
81.7
149.1
309.5
902.1
84.6
181.6
339.6
996.0
84.4
206.7
424.6
1,199.0
78.6
253 .3
525 .0
1,259.5
81.6-· -2:23 :0 -- -- 423-.0- -.. . -1,142.9

Key: 1 = Food; 2 = Beverages and tobacco; 3 = Mineral fuels; 4 = Chemicals; 5 =
Manufactured goods; 6 =Machinery; and 7 =Total imports.

Food

Food imports increased their monetary value from K 13 3.2 million in 1980 to
Kl94.6 million in 1990.

Increase over the decade is computed at K61.4 million,

averaging annually about K6.14 million. The increases over the years were gradual rather
than dramatic.

If considered as a percentage of the total import value, the increase

amounts to a small decline from 19 to 17 percent. The increase in the monetary value of
food imports occured despite the fact that about 85 percent of the population lives in the
rural areas of PNG and relies primarily upon subsistence food production.

However,

there is growing evidence that most of the subsistence farmers (who produce primarily
for household consumption) are turning towards the consumption of imported food such
as rice and tinned meat and fish from South East and North East Asia.

Because

Import data computed from PNG National Statistics Office, International Trade Imports, December quarter of 1981; June quarter of 1982; March quarter of 1983;
Pacific Economic Bulletin, vol. 8 no. 1, June 1993; Department of Trade and Resources,
Survey of Major Western Pacific Economies, Canberra: AGPS, 1986; Bank of PNG,
Quarterly Economic Bulletin, December issues of 1978, 1987, 1990, 1991 and 1992.
13
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imported food costs money, surplus food that is produced from subsistence activity is
sold at local markets for cash.

Consequently, changing consumption patterns have led

to a situation where cash crop production is replacing food production as a major
household subsistence activity to enable the growers to access imported food for
consumption.
Greater expectations of cash income from cash crop production and subsequent
wealth accumulation by producers, when compared to subsistence food production, has
led to the appropriation of more limited fertile land for the cultivation of cash crops such
as coffee, cocoa, tea, coconuts and rubber.

The limited availability of fertile land for

economic activity is also compounded by issues of land tenure, because most land is
communally owned and alienated land is very expensive.

An Asia-Pacific Economic

Group report in 1991 found that:
70 percent of [land] is considered unsuitable for agriculture because of
topography, drainage or infertility, but the remaining 30 percent is used
only at low levels of intensity. The problem [faced by foreign and
major local investors] is that only 3 percent of the land is covered by
modern, transferable title: 97 percent continues to be held on a
customary basis 14 .
Hence, land required for major economic ventures is lacking whilst there is substantial
land left for subsistence production of food, though the latter is in short supply in some
areas particularly in the Highlands and the Gazelle Peninsula. Because not much effort
and land has been mobilised toward commercial food production, PNG has to import
food stuff like rice and canned fish to meet the demand.

In spite of the land-related

difficulties discussed above, meat (beef, pork and poultry) and sugar production have
met with limited success (success in terms of production) under heavy protection, but
still in insufficient quantities to satisfy domestic demands in PNG. The inability to meet
domestic demand may be because most such products are produced for export, as is the
case with Ramu Sugar.

On the other hand, it could be related to poor quality of local

14 Asia-Pacific Economic Group, Asia-Pacific Profiles, RSPacS-ANU, 1991: 107.
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produce, for example, rice in 1979 when import quotas were instituted 15 .

Though,

technically, PNG has the potential to meet its food requirements, it has not done so.
If one looks at the national budget appropriations, the resource share to

Why?

agriculture has been maintained at between 6-10 percent in 1984-1987, while actual
expenditures have tended to fall in real terms 16 . Hence, political rhetoric about priority
going to agriculture is not reflected in resource allocation when compared to other
sectors.

Machinery and Transport Equipment and Mineral Fuels and Industrial Chemicals

Machinery, transport equipment, industrial chemicals and mineral fuel categories
also figure prominently in PNG's total import bills.

The share of machinery and

transport equipment out of total imports rose from 30 percent in 1980 to 37 percent in
1990, while the mineral fuels percentage dropped from 17 to 7 percent for the same
years, and chemicals' share remained about the same at between 5 and 7 percent. The
increases in the imports of machinery and transport equipment, mineral fuels and
chemicals do not signify a wide demand for capital goods across all sectors of the
economy, but are confined to a single sector, mining: the number of mines (in operation)
since the Bougainville mine began production in 1971 include - Ok Tedi (1984), Wau
(ceased operations in 1991), Misima (1989), Porgera (1992) and the Hides Gas Project
(1992). Lihir and others are yet to commence production.
On an annual average between 1980 - 1990, Australia accounted for 45.2 percent
of total imports into PNG.

Australia's proportion of total imports slightly decreased

from 41 percent in 1980 to 40 percent in 1985 and then increased to 47 percent in
199017.

Australia has not only been able to maintain its import market share in PNG,

BPNG, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, 1979.
16 World Bank, PNG: Selected Development Issues ... , 1982: 11.
17 BPNG, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, various years; see also table 2.
15
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but was also able to increase it , in spite of the growing competition for PNG's import
market from other sources in South East Asia, North East Asia , Japan, the United
States, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

Table 6: Major Sources of PNG's Imports (Kina millions) 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

279.2
278.3
309.5
322.5
344.8
351.5
364.5
431.7
507.4
525.2
534.4

123 .5
125.4
107.9
125.3
135.9
152.1
159.9
185.5
204.4
200.4
152.2

27.6
38.0
40.7
40.6
45.8
48.7
40.3
37.6
40.0
41.6
38.S

104.4
136.1
110.3
109.2
102.7
89.8
56.3
66.1
64.8
88.0
97.2

28.7
31.7
34.0
31.5
30.7
26.4
30.7
28.3
31.9
37.6
26.8

44.1
62.4
64.2
80.8
89.6
86.6
85 .3
80.6
104.6
145.0
109.9

Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

Key: 1 =Australia; 2 =Japan; 3 =New Zealand; 4 =Singapore; 5 =United Kingdom; 6
=United States of America
Australia's import market share has been maintained at fairly constant levels (40plus percent) by steadily increasing exports of manufactures called "elaborately
transformed manufactures" (ETMs). ETMs include autos and parts, computer software
and hardware, food and beverages, textiles, communication equipment, paper products,
iron and steel and aluminium goods 19 .

Since 1989 PNG has imported about A$807.0

million of ETMs, making it the fourth largest market for Australian ETMs20 .

These

figures highlight the importance of the PNG market for specialised Australian products .

.....-

.~.

18 The data collated come from a variety of sources including Bank of PNG, Quarterly

Economic Bulletin, Decertiber issues of 1978, 1987, 1990, 1991 and 1992; PNG
Statistical Bulletin, December issues of 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1987;
Pacific Economic Bulletin, vol. 8 no. 1, June 1993 .
19 DFAT, Insight, vol.~ no. 21_, f993,:.15; DFAT, Insight, vol. 3 no. 6, 1994: 4.
20 G. Evans, "Austrruia and 'PNG", in D. Anderson (ed.), The PNC-Australia
Relationship: -Problems and Prospects, Sydney: Pacific Security Research Institute,
1990: 7.·
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EXPORTS

PNG's major exports by total value comprise natural resources and agricultural
commodities, such as minerals, agricultural cash crops (coffee, cocoa, copra and copra
oil, tea and rubber in descending order), forestry and marine products.

Agriculture

Agriculture's share of PNG's overseas exports as a share of total exports
percentage has been overtaken by fast rising mineral exports.

The declines of

agricultural exports can also be said to arise from declining production resulting from
low commodity prices. The rise in mineral exports can be clearly seen by looking at the

/fercentage of exports attributed to agriculture.

Agriculture accounted for 5~percent of

exports in 1970, but declined to 34.4 percent in 1980, slightly increased to 35.7 percent
in 1985 and then dramatically nose-dived to a mere 17.3 percent in 199021 . In spite of
the fact that overall agricultural cash crop production has declined, coffee and cocoa
continue to maintain their share of total agricultural exports, followed by copra and
copra oil, palm oil, tea and rubber2 2 .

Mining

The mining sector contribution to the total value of exports rose from a 1980
percentage of 46.7, to 52.9 percent in 1985 reaching 69.0 percent in 1990.

The

BPNG, Quarterly Economic Bulletin ..., 1987 and 1991.
22 S. Dorney, PNG: People, Politics and History since 1975, Sydney: Random House
Australia, 1990: 87; F. Jarrett, PNG: Economic Situation and Outlook, IDI no. 11,
Canberra: AGPS, 1990: 23; H. Thompson, The Forests of PNG: The Dilemma of
Development, Murdoch University Economics Program Working Paper, no. 72, 1992: 4;
BPNG, Quarterly Economic Bulletin.. ., 1987 and 1990.
21
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Bougainville mine alone contributed 45 percent of PNG's export income and 17 percent
of government revenue in 1988 23 before the closure. The closure of the Bougainville
mine in 1989 reduced PNG's ability to raise revenue, consequently forcing the PNG
Government to request additional Australian aid.

The ceasation of exports from the

Bougainville mine has been off-set by exports from Ok Tedi, Porgera, Hides gas project,
Kutubu oil and Misima.

Forestry and Fisheries

Forestry related production has expanded from a low of 2.7 percent in 1970 to
6.6 percent in 1980, 7.3 percent in 1985 and 6.4 percent in 1990 of the value of total

exports2 4 _ Marine products, particularly fish products, have also been increasing their
export share.
PNG's exports to Australia have been quite small when compared with its exports
to other countries. PNG's exports to Australia amounted to only a quarter in value of
Australia's exports to PNG.

In spite of this fact, Australia still ranks as the third most

important destination for PNG's exports. Australia accounts for almost 10.5 percent of

total value of exports per annum. The major export destinations for PNG commodities
other than Australia are Japan and West Germany, averaging over the 10 year period
(1980-1990) about 36.1 and 27.7 percent respectively of PNG's total exports.

Consequently, Australia was a major beneficiary of bilateral trade relations.
Attempts have been made at redressing the trade imbalance via a number of trade and
economic oriented arrangements (for example, renegotiation of PATCRA, the
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, and the Double Tax Agreement). But
some critics such as Akilagpa Sawyerr in 1982, argued that economic agreements like

23 The Economist, 16 December 1989: 80.
24 BPNG, Quarterly Economic Bulletin .. ., 1987 and 1991 .
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PATCRA only strengthened Australia's position in retaining its favourable balance of
trade with PNG. This development invariably leads to dependence.

DIVERSIFICATION OF TRADE

There has been a significant diversification away from Australia of PNG's trade
Sources of exports have diversified to include Japan, South Korea, Spain,

relations.

West Germany, United Kingdom and the United States of America. Japan has become
PNG's number one destination for exports followed by West Germany.

Even though,

export destinations for PNG's commodities have diversified, Australia has maintained its
position as the number one source of imports on the basis of annual average, followed by
Japan (18 percent), Singapore (11.5 percent) and the United States (10.9 percent) of
total imports into PNG between 1980 and 1990.

Table 7: PNG's Destination for Exports (Kina millions) 25
1

2

3

4

5

252.5
241.1
186.7
235.9
226.3
199.0
256.7
301.2
495 .5
447.0
333.5

25 .1
28.8
27.5
27.8
27.1
41.3
21.3
32.9
37.5
12.2

27.6
27.6
31.9
38.5
87.0
66.0
45.2
50.4
63 .8
56.6
28.6

21.3
18.5
10.1
14.4
20.6
34.6
32.7
22.1
34.2
24.0
51.6

6

7

8

Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

55.9
53.0
45.9
50.5
64.6
91.4
149.2
84.8
83 .1
131.7
131.l

173.6
130.4
148.0
171.8
164.5
264.5
345.5 61.1
288.4 170.4
266.0 84.1
292.4 85.8
191.5 113.5

641.6
559.5
549.5
668.4
771.7
883.3
1,003.2
1, 123 .2
1,256.1
1,111.6
1,201.5

Key: 1 = Australia; 2 = Japan; 3 = Spain; 4 = United Kingdom; 5 = United States of
America; 6 =West Germany; 7 =South Korea; 8 =Total exports.

Figures are from BPNG, Quarterly Economic Bulletin ... , December issues of 1978,
1987, 1990, 1991 and 1992; PNGNSO, Statistical Bulletin, December issues of 1980,
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1987; Pacific Economic Bulletin, vol. 8 no. 1, June
1993 .

25

75

The relative displacement of Australia as PNG's major source of imports began in
the early 1980s.

The displacement is alluded to in reports that Australia's exports to

PNG had shrunk before 1988 by about 10 percent - down from 50 percent to 40 percent,
which represented a decline in monetary terms of about A$125 million26 .

Total

Australian exports between 1980 and 1990 to PNG fluctuated between the range of 37
percent in 1981 and 4 7 percent in 1990 as a percentage of total imports.

These

fluctuations did not, however, undermine the basic market share for Australian exports in
PNG.
A variety of explanations for the fluctuations alluded to above have been
advanced.

Firstly, competition from cheaper products from New Zealand (meat, dairy

products and fruits), Japan and South Korea (electrical, machinery and road transport .
equipment), South East Asia, Hong Kong and China (garments and food, particularly
rice).

Secondly, fluctuations in total percentage of Australia's exports can also be

considered to be a result of the PNG Government's desire to pursue a strategy of importsubstitution of products such as poultry, pork, fruit and vegetables, flour, smallgoods,
beverages, canned meat, sugar, soap and garments.

For these industries to survive

against international competition, the PNG Government provides protection by imposing
import barriers and restrictions.

The industries eligible for government protection

(through import barriers and restrictions) are those identified in 1982 as major
components of Australia's total exports to PNG, constituted about A$184 million (18.4
percent) out of a total value of A$1,000 million27 .

The PNG Government's desire to

diversify its international trade away from Australia and to seek alternative sources of
ODA, investment capital and skilled labour has also contributed to import fluctuations.
For example, ODA (as argued in chapter 5) generates business opportunities for the
donors' industries if that ODA is tied.

Most, ODA appart from Australian budgetary

Overseas Trading, vol. 37 no. 11, 1985: 20; B. Hayden (Foreign Minister), text of a
speech to the Joint Australia-PNG Business Co-operation Committees seminar in Port
Moresby, 7th November 1985: 1.
27 C. Hooks, "PNG finds a taste for new food", Overseas Trading, vol. 36 no. 11, 1984:
251.
26
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support is conditional, that is, it hardly leaves the shores of the donor country, because it
must be spent on the donors goods and services.

Australia has been disadvantaged as a

consequence, in part because a major part of Australian ODA to PNG has been untied or
unconditional - in principle, this untied aid did not have to be spent on Australian goods
and services (though chapter 5 provides evidence that much of that aid has in fact, been
spent on Australian goods and services, and increasingly Australian ODA is becoming
more tied).

Also, as the composition of foreign residents changes, including the

entrepreneurial class, tastes change: new residents will remain loyal to their ethnic
background and tastes, meaning that Australia loses business. It is therefore plausible to
conclude on the one hand that Australia's position as the centre of PNG's commercial
interests will be maintained if aid becomes increasingly tied, thereby increasing Australia's
exports.

On the other hand, Australia's position

as the major source of PNG's

economic activity, may be weakened with PNG's diversification exercise away from
Australia for imports, investment, ODA and skilled manpower, and if import-substitution
policy becomes successful.

INVESTMENT

Australian ownership and control of the PNG economy (excluding forestry and
fisheries) is not accidental.

The predominance of Australian ownership and control of

the Territory's economy was a direct result of colonial policies regarding business
incorporation in the Territory.

Specific pro-Australian provisions were enacted to

safeguard Australia's position in PNG. Provisions such as the New Guinea Corporations
Act actively prohibited non-British subjects from incorporating companies unless two
thirds of the members were British subjects28.
indigenes and non-British citizens.
subjects.

The Act automatically excluded

The indigenous people were not regarded as British

It was a pro-British (particularly pro-Australian) Act explicitly intended to

28 M. Donaldson, "Class formation in PNG: the indigenous bourgeoisie", Journal of
Australian Political Economy, no. 7, 1980: 69.
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preserve the Territory for British and Australian economic and commercial interests.
The Act was supplemented by other prohibitive measures such as licensing laws relating
to retail sales of alcohol, public transport and coffee buying29 that reduced indigenous
participation.

Consequently, Australian private capital became the most significant

source of investment in and to PNG.

Investment data available for the period between

1970 and 1979, confirms the advantage Australia enjoyed: out of the total Australian
investment stock in all countries of A$1,440 million, PNG accounted for A$420
million30 . Despite the substantial Australian investment stock already in PNG, the flow
of new investment to the Territory from Australia started declining after peaking at the
1973 figure of A$285 million to A$229 million in 1975 "due to the sale of the proportion
of the shareholding in BCL to the PNG Government" 31 .

The flow of new investment

continued to decline from A$51 million in 1975/76 to A$26 million in 1976/77, finally
falling to A$25 million in 197717832. The total decline of new investment flow to PNG
from Australia between 1975/76 and 1977/78 was A$26 million.

The declines in

existing investment stock and flow of investment into the country were related to the
period of uncertainty at independence fanned by local and national governments'
intentions to nationalise foreign owned businesses and localise employees in order to gain
control of economic affairs and the uncertainty generated by the prophets of doom
focasting chaos, which caused the business community to disinvest and put new
investment on hold33 . As the business community realised nothing dramatic was going
to happen after a smooth transition of power to indigenes and the new Government went
about allaying fears of nationalisation, investment flow into PNG picked up again. The
confidence shown by the business community regarding investment in PNG is confirmed

29 Ibid

30 Australia-PNG Investment Promotion Conference Report, 1979: 4.
31 SSCFAD, (Reference: Australia and the South Pacific) Official Hansard Transcript

of Evidence, vol. 1, 1977: 84.
32 Australia-PNG Investment Promotion Conference Report, 1979: 4; A. Sawyerr,
"Relations of dependence ... ", 1983 : 27 5.
33 P. Barchan (Australian Trade Commissioner, Port Moresby), "Competitors threaten
Australia's strength as supplier to PNG", Overseas Trading, vol. 30 no. 2, 1978: 56.
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today by total Australian investment stock being reputed to be in the vicinity of A$ l. 8
billion34.
The table below, however, shows that investment stock in PNG did not remain
steady, but was quite erratic.

It rose by A$507 million between 1980/81 and 1983/84,

declining by A$160 million in 1985/86, and hovered for the last years of the 1980s
between a low of A$1,437 and a high of A$1,725 million.

It is obvious that some

investment stock in PNG had been either sold to other private investors (both national
and foreign), other than Australian investors or simply shut down. There was also some
movement of investment out of PNG during 1980/81 and 1985/86 which was computed
at around A$30 million and A$ l 07 million respectively35.

Table 8: Levels of Existing Australian Investment Stock and Income in PNG (A$
millions) 36
Investment Stock

Year
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90

509
878
850
1,016
994
856
1,437
1,725
1,494
1,556

Investment Income
62
49
47
108
53
141
61
3
n.y.a
n.y.a

A significant proportion of foreign capital investment is concentrated in primary
production (agriculture) and the exploitation and extraction of
(particularly mining).

natural resources

There is very limited investment in food production and

G. Evans, "Australia and PNG... ", 1990: 7.
35 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Official Yearbook of Australia, 1988: 909.
36 These figures were compiled from Australian Bureau of Statistics, !988 Yearbook of
Australia, no. 71, Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1988: 910; 1992
Yearbook of Australia, no. 75, Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1992:
726.
34
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manufacturing. In the mining and the service37 sectors, Australian companies are major
investors (for the mining sector, see table 9). The huge amounts of capital required to
develop large mines cannot be met internally. Their developments is financed externally.
This means that ownership is significantly foreign (see table 9). Consequently, profits in
most instances are repatriated out of PNG by foreign individuals and organisations by
virtue of ownership (or shareholding).
In spite of the high levels of investment, income has not been necessarily enough
to compensate for the high levels of capital costs.

Table 8 above records income much

lower than total investment.

37 Australian companies like Steamships, W. R. Carpenters and Burns Philp dominated

the retail sub-sector (until the 1990s when Australian interests were bought up by other
foreign interests). In the banking and insurance industry, Australian finns like, the ANZ
Banking Group, Wespac Banking Group and Queensland Insurance are dominant.
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Table 9: Principal Gold Mining/Exploitation Sites and Developers, PNG38
Mine

Start-up

Bougainville

1972

Ok Tedi

1984

Ownership%
CRA(a)
PNG Government
Public

54
20

BHP

30
30
30

AMOCO
BRD Cons.
PNG Government

26

IO
100

Wau

1985(b)

Renison

Misima

1989

Placer
PNG Government

80
20

Porgera

1992

Placer
MIM
Renison
PNG Government

25
25
25
25

Mt. Kare(c)

CRA(a)

100

RTZ
Niugini

80

Hides Gas
Lihir(d)

20

Notes:
(a)
(b)
( c)
(d)

CRA is a 49 percent-owned affiliate ofRTZ
Wau first began operation in 193 3, but has ceased production in 1990.
CRA has been forced out and replaced by a national company
Not yet in production, and by then the PNG Government will probably buy 30
percent.

38 These figures of ownership and shareholdings were compiled by M. Howard, Mining,

Politics and Development in the South Pacific, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991 : 69.
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The PNG Government's concentration on fostering the development of the agriculture
and mining sectors, coincidentally suggests that the Government gives less attention to
food production and the manufacturing sector. Mines are seen by the PNG Government
as "useful not for direct benefits they bring but for the financial support they can provide
for progress towards other national goals" 39 .

Though the PNG Government's lack of

political will and planning contributes towards the stagnation of the manufacturing
sector, thereby undermining its potential for improving the monetary value of primary
products, investors have also been constrained because they (investors) think it is
unprofitable.

Manufacturing is believed to be unprofitable because of extremely high

labour costs compared to other developing countries, expensive transport infrastructure,
a small, fragmented domestic market and other expensive overheads such as security
expenses (law and order).
The investment capital required by PNG in the development of its natural
resources is dependent upon Australian private business interests and what these interests
hope to gain monetarily, and or whether the investment environment in terms of law and
order, tax, growth potential, etc ...is conducive. Australian Government interests relating
to both domestic and external socio-political and military-strategic interests also (will in
the future) continue to have a significant influence upon the direction (types of sectors primary, mining and service) and the level of investment entering into PNG. Since most
of the investment originates from the private sector, economic considerations tend to be
paramount.

The Australian Government would be expected to intervene only in

protecting economic interests from possible expropriation, as evidenced in the way it has
negotiated various economic-related, bilateral agreements such as PATCRA, the JDP
and the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement.

AIDAB, PNG: Economic Situation and Outlook, IDI no. 4, Canberra: AGPS, 1988:
16.
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CONCLUSION

Australia's position as PNG's number one trading partner is increasingly coming
under threat from Japan (exports and imports), USA and Germany (exports), New
Zealand and countries of South East and North East Asia (imports).

Nevertheless, the

position of Australia as PNG's major source of imports remains, because of the fact that
a substantial component of exports to PNG from Australia comprise capital equipment,
food products and increasingly ETMs.

Australia faces competition from the above

countries only in garments, food and fuel exports.
Investment in-the mining sector will remain the domain of Australian -interests -for -- --- ----- ..
the foreseeable future.

The immediate challenge to Australian dominance originates

from Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan and Indonesia in the forestry, fisheries and agricultural
sectors. Increasingly, Malaysia is a major player in the forest industry, while Japan and
Taiwan are concentrating upon fisheries and agriculture. The dominant roles of Asian
countries in the exploitation of PNG's resources complements the PNG Government's
initiative to move away from Australia as its source of capital investment, with a long
term view to reduce its economic dependence on Australia.
Diversification of commerce and investment has generated two contradictory
developments.

Firstly, diversification has reduced PNG's dependence upon a single

source of imports, aid and investment, and in tum minimised opportunities for the major
partner to influence the minor partner's foreign policy.

Effectively, then, diversification

has improved the conditions in which PNG can exercise foreign policy independence.
Secondly, diversification might just give rise to another form of dependency.

In other

words, rather than becoming independent economically, PNG might develop another
relationship similar to the one that has existed and still exists between it and Australia.
PNG's independence would again be compromised.
Even though,

diversification 1s

necessary m attaining

foreign

policy

independence, if implemented for its own sake, PNG could simply become more
dependent on others - and hence loss a substantial degree of policy independence.

CHAPTER4

THE AID RELATIONSHIP

The aid relationship is a major component of the wider overall relationship
between Australia and PNG.

Even after 16 years of PNG's political independence in

1975, Australia continued (and still continues) to provide substantial levels of aid, though
at gradually declining 'real' value, and with the proportion of direct grants declining as
the proportion of project and program aid increase.

I will be arguing that, despite the

substantial aid dependence by PNG on Australia, this dependence did not hinder PNG's
ability · to pursue a bilateral relationship with Australia which can be regarded as
independent.

DEFINITIONS

There are a variety of ways of defining aid.

The United Nations (UN) defines it

as only those transfers (grants and short- and long-term loans) made at concessional
ratesl.

Loans taken out at market rates do not qualify as aid.

The Organisation of

Economic Co-operation and Development defines official development assistance (ODA)
to include
those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions
provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or
by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the
following tests:
a) It is administered with the promotion of the econonnc
development and welfare of developing countries as its main
objective, and

1 T. Hayter,

The Creation of World Poverty, London: Pluto Press, 1981.
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b) It is concessionl in character and contains a grant element of at
least 25 percent2
The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development definition of aid has
changed very little over the years3.
Aid also has been considered to cover virtually all aspects of economic relations
between developed and developing countries - aid not only includes grants and loans but,
investment and trade as well4 . Investment and trade generally improve the environment
for increased economic activities, which, in turn, generate revenue that may be utilised to
finance the overall socio-welfare, and economic projects and programs.

The chances of

achieving projected overall development policies, projects and programs of the recipient
in pursuing better health services, increased opportunities for education and manpower
training, development of an efficient transport infrastructure, etc ... are likely to be
improved because finance capital will become readily available. Still, other definitions of
ODA regard official government-to-government transfers of resources as the only
transfer of resources worthy to be legitimately called aid. These transfers comprise
budgetary grants, food aid, skilled manpower, scholarships and technical assistance.
For the purpose of this chapter, I will adopt the AIDAB definition of aid as
only flows which qualify as "ODA", that is, grants or loans to
developing countries and territories and to multilateral institutions
which (a) are undertaken by the official sector, (b) have the promotion
of economic development and welfare as main objectives, and (c) are

Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, Geographical Distribution
of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, Organisation of Economic Co-operation
and Development: France, 1990: 341.
3 The 1990 definition of ODA has changed little from the definition of ODA rendered in
1969 by the OECD to include
all aid flows (grants and loans) to developing countries provided by
governments which are administered with, as their main motive, the
promotion of economic development and welfare of recipient
countries, and which are intended to be concessional in character
(OECD, Australia's international development assistance, a report
prepared by the Secretatriat of the OECD in consultation with
Australian authorities, 1969: 11 ).
4 H. Arnold, Aid/or Development, London: Bodely Head Ltd., 1966: 7.
2
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made at concessional :financial terms (if a loan, at least 35 percent is
grant element5 .
Australian aid to PNG comprises budgetary support, project and program aid,
educational and manpower training scholarships and the defence co-operation program.
Australian commercial interests and investment in PNG are substantial but, I will not
consider these as aid as they do not come under the definition tendered above as their
grant element is less than 35 percent (being commercial, they include no grant element at
all).

RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES OF AUSTRALIAN AID

The maJor objective of Australian aid is to facilitate social and econormc
development and to alleviate poverty6.
changes a little from year to year.

However, the objective is never static, it

The use of the term Development in this context is

adopted from the Jackson Report which defined it
as the way in which the quality of human life and society is improved
and is integrally linked to both growth and equity7 .
The achievement of economic and socio-political development is deemed necessary by
the Australian Government for the establishment of a secure regional and international
environment in which national interests can be pursued. But the development objective
is never pursued discretely from other similarly important motivations, such as altruism
and humanitarianism, trade and commerce, domestic and foreign policy, militarystrategic and political objectives8 . Philip Eldridge suggests that
from its [aid] inception in the early 1950s, Australian aid policy has
sought to serve several objectives, notably strategic, diplomatic, trade,

5 AIDAB, Australian Official Development Co-operation Statistical Summary 1991192,

Canberra: AGPS, 1993 : 113 .
6 The Jackson Report, Canberra: AGPS, 1984: 9; S. Brown, Foreign Aid in Practice,
London: Pinter Reference, 1990: 62; Budget Related Paper: Australia's Overseas Aid
Program 1991-93, 1992: 11.
7 The Jackson Report ... , 1984: 59.
8 See Ibid: 3.
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employment of Australian expertise and institutional resources as well
as humanitarian purpose9 .
These sentiments were explicitly outlined by the Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth
Evans, in 1989 in a speech to the Australian Committee For Overseas Aid in which he
summed up succinctly Australia's own motives for giving aid. He argued that our aid expenditure is both altruistic and in our own interests, and is
capable of being looked at from both these perspectives.
All
Australia's aid, to qualify for that description under international
accounting rules, has to be altruistic: alleviating poverty and distress
and promoting development. But equally, all Australian aid can be
seen as promoting one or more very direct and very real Australian
interests - whether those interests be traditional geopolitical and
strategic foreign policy interests, trade and economic interests or
simply Australian's reputational interests in being seen to be a good
international citizen Io.
The above view had earlier been recorded in the Jackson Report 11, where
development was viewed as one of several objectives targeted by aid, and by Connell 12 .
The moral factor was again highlighted in a public opinion survey of the Australian
public regarding foreign aid by Jonathan Kelley in 1988, in which the majority of
respondents strongly supported the view that providing foreign aid is a moral duty ... .In the public mind, foreign
aid is seen basically as welfare for foreigners - charity for the poor in
other lands 13 .
Hence aid is not discerned by the survey participants as an instrument to advance
Australia's domestic commercial, security and foreign policy objectives. Further still, aid,
the survey results concluded, should not be provided in order to enhance Australia's

P. Eldridge, "Philosophy and strategy of the Jackson Report: towards an alternative
perspective", in P . Eldridge, D . Forbes and D . Porter (eds.), Australian Overseas Aid
Future Directions, Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986: 5.
10 G. Evans cited by AIDAB, "Making Australia's overseas aid count: an overview of
AIDAB's quality assurance and mechanisms", Appraisals, Evaluation and Sectoral
Studies Branch Development Paper 1991, no. 2 Canberra: AGPS, 1991: 22.
11 The Jackson Report... , 1984: 9.
12 J. Connell, "Small states large aid: the benefits of benevolence in the South Pacific", in
P. Eldridge et. al. (eds.), Australia's Overseas Aid. .. , 1986: 58-59.
13 J. Kelley, Australian Attitudes: Social and Political Analysis from the National Social
Science Survey, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988: 67; 70; 79.
9
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international standing or even to support Australia's allies to maintain and develop
security alliances. Consequently, foreign aid was viewed by a majority of Australians
recorded in Kelley's survey was viewed as a "moral duty and not a decision [to be]
determined by pragmatism and self-interest".

The implicit assumption underlying this

moral determinant of aid donation is that it lessens the degree to which Australia can
influence PNG's external policy. Moral arguments can be responsible for the emergence
of policy independence in this instance.

BENEFITS OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Economic

In recent times, it has become commonly accepted that aid in a majority of
instance_s also benefits the donor.

In some instances, the benefits accruing to the donor

are greater than benefits to the aid recipient.

The benefits to the donor are long-term,

and include the generation of new market opportunities and development of a
partnership between government and private sector in implementing projects through the
provision of direct services and goods 14 . New markets are created because the nature
of tied aid is such that it is spent on procurement of goods and services from industries
and businesses of donor countries.
In considering Australian ODA to developing countries, Australian industry
benefits in three ways, namely by
(a) promoting growth and stability in developing countries, thus
promoting the expansion of important markets for Australian goods
and services; (b) helping to develop new export markets; and (c)
generating purchases of Australian goods and servicesl5.

14 G. Evans,

Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates (Senate), vol. s. 114,

1986: 1722.
15 The Jackson Report, 1984: 33; AIDAB, Australia's Overseas Aid Program: Helping
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Australian aid acts as a vehicle in the establishment and expansion of new
markets for a variety of Australian industries, firms and producers. The markets are an
incidence of the introduction, establishment and the maintenance of new consumption
patterns/tastes for imports of Australian non-durables and durables.

The benefits

accruing from ODA for Australia's own firms are further enhanced by official shifts of
aid from budgetary support to project and program aid (at least in the case of PNG)
coupled with procurement 'tying'. Industry compliance to procurement tying is obtained
by the donor government's (in this

case Australian Government) insistence on a

minimum 20 percent direct purchases of goods and services from Australian industries
and businesses under the procurement regulations and preference arrangements 16 .
Australian industries and companies are explicitly assured a minimum 20 percent of the
benefits from aid. Because of the above, employment opportunities are also created.
The above assumptions were substantiated in an AIDAB publication in 1990 for
the 1987-88 financial year suggesting that about 80 percent of total country programs 17,
expenditure (exceeding the minimum by 60 percent), excluding budget support to PNG,
was spent directly on Australian goods and services 18 .

Australian industries and

institutions recorded the highest financial returns at 100 percent for student subsidy, food
aid, commodity assistance and co-financing. Consequently, these forms of aid contribute
toward the generation of economic activity in which domestic Australian firms and
industries participate.
The same AID AB publication also records that in the 1987/88 fiscal year
Australian aid generated direct returns to Australian commercial interests for purchases

Australian Industry too, IDI no. 10, Canberra: AGPS, 1990: 1.
16 AIDAB, A/DAB and Your Business, Canberra: AGPS, 1987: 4; Joint Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations with the South Pacific,
Canberra: AGPS, 1989: 76.
17 Expenditures under the general umbrella of country programs include projects,
student subsidy, food aid, training, commodity assistance support program/development
import grant scheme, co-financing and staffing assistance (AIDAB, Australia's Overseas
Aid Program: Helping Australian Industry too, IDI no. 10, Canberra: AGPS, 1990: 10.
18 Ibid
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of goods and services to the value of 87 percent of total aid expenditure in the major
areas 19 . Budget support to PNG with no conditions attached provided a return of 75
percent to Australian industry, underlining that even budget support is not immune from
returning to its origins20.
Hence, the notion that aid donors are not the beneficiaries in the aid relationship
should be viewed with caution, because the evidence above suggests aid donors are
indeed significant beneficiaries.

Security

Conventional military-strategic policies such as improving the capability of
defence forces by donating bigger and better equipment, enlarging the armed forces and
entering into military alliances with major powers have sometimes been found to be
inadequate on their own in fostering national security.
The Dibb Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities m 1986 suggested
Australian
foreign policy, aid programs and defence policy should be co-ordinated
carefully with other regional states so as to discourage unwelcome
military access (by states such as Libya, former USSR, China, etc .. .,) in
the South Pacific21 .
Development assistance (other than military assistance) has been and is intended
to continue to be used to improve Australia's security at minimum cost.

Australia's

limited resources undermine its capacity to defend and guarantee the security of its
neighbours.

National military-strategic interests cannot be attained by purely

conventional military means.

Moreover, the divide based upon ideologies which

19 Ibid: 13, The major areas of expenditure include country programs, PNG budget

support, global programs and corporate services.
2o Ibid

21 P. Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Canberra: AGPS, 1987: 4-5 .
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spawned the Cold War is gone, replaced by adherence to the rule of international law and
co-operation through international organisations (particularly the United Nations).
Though the majority of Australians still hold to the belief that aid is a moral duty,
the evidence suggests that morality in most cases plays second fiddle to other, higher
national interests, namely independence and sovereignty. In regions and areas where it
would be awkward for other motives to be highlighted, morality becomes an important
concept in justifying ODA distribution. In the case of PNG however, Australian aid is
not decided by morality but by issues of security and economic factors.

This view is

justified by the figures cited in the foregoing discussion.

TYPES OF AID

Australian aid to PNG is disbursed in several forms as discussed below. The first
of these comprises budget support grants. Budget support has been a major component
of the aid relationship between Australia and PNG. Budget support is unconditional and
comprises transfers of financial resources directly into the PNG national budget. Project

aid has been the least significant in monetary value2 2. Project aid by definition is
specifically ear-marked for the funding of specific projects. The resources (technical or
financial) allocated for these projects cannot be diverted to other than the originally
identified projects except by agreement.

Program aid emerged from the JCF ADT

inquiry into the relations between Australia and PNG in 1991 .

Program aid is

particularly geared toward
direct funding of a sector, such as education or the police to achieve
designated outcomes2 3.
The Australian Federal Government equates program aid with sectoral assistance24.
Program aid is geared toward high priority areas identified by the recipient in

22 See Table 10 for the amounts of aid under various programs.
23 JCFADT, Australia's Relations with PNG .. ., 1991: 143.
24 BRP no. 4, 1991: 21.
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consultation with the donor. The objectives may be to improve sectoral capabilities and
efficiency in the delivery of goods and service. Substantial parts of the program are
undertaken by the recipient, with the donor implementing some aspects of the program
when and if requested.

AID AGREEl\ffiNTS

The aid relationship between Australia and PNG has been conducted under
several formal agreements. A total of five aid related agreements or arrangements have
been reached between the two countries since formal severance of colonial relations in
1975 and 1990. Not all agreements were adhered to; there were occasions when they
were unilaterally broken by either one or both contracting parties.
Budget support for 1979/80, 1985/86 and 1990/91 accounted for $232.0, $302.8
and $275.0 million respectively. Significantly, the increase recorded in the 1985/86 and
1986/87 financial years were due to the supplementary grants made by Australia on the
request of the PNG Government to compensate for the downturn in foreign earnings
resulting from the international economic recession. The project component of aid,
excluding payments for retirement of public servants from the administration and
Australian Staffing Assistance Group (ASAG), increased from a low of $1. 7 million in
1980/81 to $4 .1 million in 1985/86, reaching $31 .7 million in 1990/91 . Retirement and
ASAG payments were made to Australian citizens whose employment within the PNG
Government service ended in retirement or to support Australian civil servants still
employed by the PNG Government. If the above aid expenses on retirement and ASAG
are excluded ($153.4 million between 1979/80 and 1990/91), Australian ODA to PNG
would amount to $3,366.5 million between 1979/80 and 1990/91. The decreases of
budget support according to the agreement reached between the two countries in the
latter part of the 1980s were partly off-set by increases in both project and program
related aid activities. Even though, the increases in project and program aid partly offset
the gradually declining budget support, total Australian aid did continue to decline in real
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value after allowance for inflation was made and other factors like economic recession.
Under the revised aid formula, Australian budget support to PNG will cease by the year
2000.

Table 10: Australian ODA to PNG, 1979180to1990191 (Actual A$ millions)25
Year

Budget
Support

Program
Activities

Retirement
ASAG

Total

1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91

223 .0
232.0
241 .3
252.8
288.1
299.0
302.8
304.5
275 .0
275.0
275.0
275.0

2.5
1.7
2.2
2.5
5.9
3.1
4.1
7.7
9.9
14.4
37.3
31.7

13.1
11.2
10.3
9.6
11.6
12.0
12.4
13.l
14.4
14.5
15.1
16.1

238.6
244.9
253 .8
264.9
305 .6
314.1
319.3
325 .3
299.3
303 .9
327.4
322.8

3,243.5

123 .0

. 153 .4

Total

3,519.4

Not all parties on the PNG side are happy with the set target date to phase out
budget support by the year 2000 when it will be completely replaced with project and
program related aid.
developments.

Sir Julius Chan has expressed strong reservations against such

Sir Julius' reservations are related to issues of control and independence

over aid expenditure and project selection for funding.

25 All the ODA figures are from Australia's Overseas Aid Program, Budget Relater

Papers, for the years between 1979/80 and 1990/91; Budget Statements, for the years
between 1979/80 and 1990/91.
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1974175to1980181

The first bilateral aid agreement was reached in 1974 prior to PNG's political
independence in 1975. Australia agreed to provide PNG with a total aid package of
A$500 million for the 1974/75 to 1975/76 financial years.
At the end of the first aid agreement (of 1974/75) in 1976, the Prime Minister of
Australian Mr. Malcolm Fraser in a letter to the Prime Minister of PNG Mr. Somare
agreed to the first of three five year aid arrangements, worth A$ l, 060 million for
1976/77 to 1980/81. Under the 1976 aid agreement, Australia provided $180.0 million
per annum, including annual supplements to account for inflation and other factors in
grants-in-aid throughout the duration of the agreement26.. Supplementary payments for
1979/80 and 1980/81 were set at $43 .0 and $52.0 million respectively27 .

1981182 to 1990191

The second five year agreement amounting to a total of A$1,326 million for
1981/82 to 1985/86 financial years was agreed to in an exchange of letters in 1980
between the Australian Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Doug Anthony and the Prime
Minister of PNG Sir Julius Chan. The 1980 five year agreement essentially heralded a
gradual shift in aid relations between the two parties. First, the 1980 agreement signalled
PNG's maturity in its dealings with Australia as an independent state and also highlighted
the constantly declining proportion of Australian aid in PNG's budget. Secondly, the
agreement also recognised and acknowledged PNG's continuing preference for budget
support type aid. The preference for budget support by the Government of PNG over
project and program aid was based on the belief that such aid allowed PNG to exert

26 Budget Papers 1979180,
27 Ibid

1980: 173.
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maximum control in the expenditure of aid through its domestic budgetary process (as a
policy instrument).

As a result of this preference (for budget support), the PNG

Government had more influence in the determination of the direction of the national
development path toward the fostering of economic and foreign policy independence
from Australia. The eventual attainment of economic and hence, policy independence
was and is an important long-term objective for the Government of PNG and its citizens.
There was one other important development which also emerged out of the 1980
agreement. Both Australia and PNG agreed to an annual decrease in the 'real' value of
the budget support component by 5 percent during the duration of the agreement, and
increasing project and technical aid by about the same proportion. This was the first time
a formula was set in place to determine annual grants to PNG2 8 .
However, during the second year of the 1980 aid agreement (1981/82 to
1985/86), the world was hit by an international economic recession.

The recession

imposed severe economic difficulties upon PNG as a producer of minerals and
agricultural commodities, culminating in low demand for primary consumer goods,
subsequently lowering commodity prices and eventually diminishing PNG's foreign
exchange earning ability. The above circumstances prompted the PNG government to
request additional aid as well as a reduction in the existing 5 percent rate of agreed
decline in budget aid per annum.

Responding to the request in 1983, after due

consideration, the Australian Government agreed to additional assistance of A$92 million
for the remaining three years of the agreement - adding an extra A$30.7 million per
annum on top of the existing A$265 million (totalling about A$295.7 million per annum
during the remaining three years of the agreement). The 1980 reduction formula for
budget support was revised from 5 percent to 1 percent, 2 percent and 3 percent in the
remaining years of the agreement respectively29 , increasing by 1 percent per annum. In
spite of the extra aid and the revision in the annual rate of decrease in the 'real' value of

Budget Statements 1981182, 1981: 190.
29 Budget Statements 1983184, 1983: 226.
28
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the grant-in-aid, the Australian Prime Minister Mr. Robert Hawke took advantage of the
opportunity to re-confirm Australia's commitment to pursuing the continuing reduction
in real terms of budget aid, but at predetermined and manageable levels (as agreed to in
the revised decreases).

The reductions were only put on hold because of the bleak

international economic climate.

At about the same time, voices for greater Australian control particularly over
support grant aid expenditure, began emerging both in Australia and PNG.

These

dissenting voices argued that PNG over the years had performed well below the ASEAN
states' growth average of about 3 percent (1980 to 1987) per annum30 and that socioeconomic development was still dismal 16 years and A$4,409.3 million later.

The

argument was then advanced to the conclusion that the stagnation in the development of
PNG's socio-economy occurred because budgetary support had not been appropriately
spent. The dissenting voices callin for a significant shift of aid emphasis from budget
support to project and program aid were given impetus by two Australian Federal
Government commissioned committee inquiry reports31 .

The PNG Government, in

recognising the above sentiments in a submission to the 1984 Federal Parliamentary
inquiry into the Australian overseas aid program, strongly reaffirmed PNG's desire to see
a continuous decline in aid in pursuit of self-reliance. The PNG Government, however,
argued that reductions should be worked out in advance and included in the aid
arrangements framework to minimise uncertainty in PNG's budget planning.
The Jackson report specifically concluded that development in PNG had been
lagging behind countries in the South East Asian region despite substantial Australian
aid. The Jackson report also asserted that, in order to facilitate growth, more attention
should be focused upon long-term development issues such as the development of

30 P. McCawley and S. Phillips, "Australia's aid to PNG: issues and prospects", in D.
Anderson (ed.), The PNG-Australia Relationship: Problems and Prospects, Sydney:
Pacific Security Research Institute, 1990: 52.
31 See Crawford Report, 1981; The Jackson Report, 1984.
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trained manpower which was still an acute problem after sixteen years of
independence3 2. The Jackson Report finally recommended that
(a) there should be a gradual, predictable decline in budget support (5
percent a year in real terms); (b) additional bilateral aid to PNG
should be provided on the same terms as Australian aid to other
countries; and ( c) an overall ceiling should be placed on total
Australian aid to PNG to ensure a decline of at least 3 percent a year3 3 .
The Jackson Report recommended that the decrease in the 'real' value of budget
support to PNG should be five percent, two percent higher than the figure agreed to for
the last year of the second five year agreement.

It also recommended that the decrease

in the overall ceiling of Australian aid to PNG should be by about three percent per year.
The most drastic recommendation was that aid to PNG should attract terms and
conditions similar to aid disbursed to other countries.

These conditions include more

tied aid, both project and program.
The influence of the Jackson Report's recommendations on the changes
introduced during the negotiations of the third 5 year aid agreement was very substantial.
The third five year agreement memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed in 1985
for 1986/87 to 1990/91.

The MOU continued the reduction of budget support aid

according to the formula revised in mid 1983 at about 3 percent per annum34 (for the
final year of the second five year aid agreement).

The revised formula entrenched the

progressive decline of budget support, but off-set it by corresponding increases in both
project and program components of the aid arrangements. The Reports which led to the
second and third agreements (by Crawford and Jackson) implicitly asserted that PNG
failed in the administration and the implementation of Australian ODA, particularly direct
grants, and therefore more Australian control was desirable. The conclusions reached in
the Jackson Report confirmed that budget support had not been spent to obtain the

32 AIDAB,

Australia's Development Co-operation with PNG, a submission to the

JCFADT inquiry, Canberra: AGPS, 1989: 8.
33 Jbid
34 Budget Statements 1986187, 1986: 237.
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maximum benefit for PNG by the Government of PNG, and thus it was necessary to
consider other forms of aid.
Again in 1986, adverse economic circumstances forced Australia to renege on its
aid agreement with PNG. Significantly, Australia reduced its global total aid budget
allocation by about 12.4 percent in real terms. This decision was taken to
curb the level of real government spending and reduce pressures on
Australia's external account35.
The austerity measures flowed on to individual country aid programs, resulting in
the corresponding reductions in PNG's total aid by A$ I 0 million in the 1986/87 financial
year. The continuing economic woes made it necessary for the Australian Government
after consultation to review the 1985 MOU, which was replaced by a new arrangement
which provided A$275 million in aid for the remaining 1987/88 and 1988/89 financial
years, including A$12 million and A$15 million in project aid for the two years as weII36 .
The uncertainties created by the sudden changes, particularly in the amounts of
budget support in arrangements between the two countries were responsible for the
emergence in PNG of an initiative for the establishment of some form of an official or
formal arrangement to give some stability to the fluctuating aid relationship. Out of this
exercise emerged the Joint Declaration of Principles (JDP), which was signed in 1987
and the subsequent Development Co-operation Treaty (DCT), which was reached in
1989.

Both these arrangements were designed to set up a formal framework in the

conduct of aid and other bilateral relations between Australia and PNG. But the JDP and
DCT were preceded by an earlier proposal submitted by PNG to govern the relations
under an integrated development package consisting of trade, aid, investment
and other co-operative measures including a move to diversify sources
of aid by fast-tracking its participation in the World Bank Consultative
Group process 37 .

35 AIDAB, Australia's Development Co-operation with PNG ..., 1989: 8.
36 Ibid: 9.
37 Ibid
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The integrated development package was dropped because the Australian
Government was opposed to it, and the signing of JDP undermined its prospective
significance. The JDP was used by the Australian Government as an alternative to the
integrated development package - in other words, Australia's acceptance of the JDP was
on condition that the PNG Government should not pursue the integrated development
package. Both the JDP and the DCT cushioned and minimised the potentially disruptive
effects of sudden future changes in aid arrangements oin the policy and development
process in PNG.

SIDFTING SANDS : BUDGET SUPPORT TO PROJECT AND PROGRAM AID

The Jackson Report recommended that both countries should strongly consider a
gradual shrift away from direct budget support to project and program aid. In fact, The
Jackson Report argued that by the year 2005 (now set at 2000) budget support should be
totally phased out and replaced by project or program aid. A number of arguments for
and against the shift in aid will be discussed below.

Arguments for the shift are:

Accountability

The most important argument supporting the shift from budget support to project
and program aid is that of accountability to the donor by the recipient regarding the
expenditure (of direct budgetary grants). Because budget support is unconditional and
very little if any influence is exerted by the donor, on most occasions it is difficult to
monitor how grant aid is used for the attainment of long-term development objectives of
PNG. What has emerged from a variety of inquiries and hearings on Australia-PNG
relations is that the impact of budget support on PNG's overall development has been
quite difficult to identify specifically. The studies and the various Parliamentary inquiries
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show also that GDP growth from 1970 to 1990 has been estimated at 1.9 percent, which
is lower than for other developing countries in the region3 8. Other indicators such as life
expectancy, mortality rates and primary school enrolments of school age children have
undergone very little change in the 29 years between 1970 and the latest figures available
for 1989, if compared again with other developing countries.

Table 11: PNG Social Indicators for the Years 1970and199939
1970

Latest (1989)

Primary school enrol

52%

64%

Life expectancy

46

54

Infant mortality
per 1000 age<l year

125
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Social discontent (crimes like burglary and break-ins) and a general deauthorisation of central authority particularly in the urban slums of major towns and rural
areas are indicative of the general inability of the central government to deliver goods
and services.

Social disenchantment and de-authorisation both occur because the

majority of the intended recipients of aid do not benefit from it.

Co"uption and Misappropriation

Corruption and misappropriation have also been mentioned as important reasons
for the shift from budget support arrangement to project and program aid. By definition,
corruption entails the use of public monies for personal gain, while misappropriation may

38 The Jackson Report, 1984; PNG and Australia: PNG Perspectives, Australian
National University Public Affairs Conference, 13th-14th September 1984, University
House, ANU: 2; World Bank, World Development Report: Development and
Environment, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992: 220.
39 Figures taken out from the Pacific Economic Bulletin, vol. 5 no. 2, December 1990:
46.
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include the use of resources for other than their intended purpose. The JCF ADT inquiry
into Australia-PNG relations in 1991 was presented with a number of submissions
alleging that direct grants have been used for other than the stated purposes, and that
some of the budget support had been used for personal enrichment and political
patronage. One of the most popular cases which has been advanced in support for the
shift in aid type has been the argument that the now (in) famous "slush funds"
(development funds as PNG politicians would rather have them known) given to each
member of Parliament are, in effect, funded by Australian budget support or from
internal revenue.

The slush fund, it has been argued, has been used to maintain

electorates' allegiance to incumbent politicians through the buying of votes by gifts and
projects. On most occasions, the economic viability of projects supported from such
funds does not meet funding criteria, and the benefits accruing to the wider community
are very minimal indeed. However, even though the arguments have merit, there is no
proof to suggest that Australian direct grant aid to PNG has funded these excesses.
The counter arguments against project and program aid include:

Independence and Sovereignty

The first argument relates to control and sovereignty or independence, which was
highlighted during the debate in the Papua and New Guinea House of Assembly in
197440_ From an Australian perspective, lack of control over budget support opens up

opportunities for corruption and misappropriation as discussed above.

To curtail

corruption and misappropriation, Australia would prefer to be involved in the
expenditure of its aid.

The Australian Government here see its involvement and

participation in the implementation of project and program aid as a desirable means
through which it could exert influence and control over the expenditure of aid.
However, the PNG Government argues that project and program aid would increase

40 Papua and New Guinea House of Assembly Debates, 1974.
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Australian influence in the decision-making process of development policy formulation,
project and program identification and implementation.

This can leave the PNG

Government open to accusations of being under the control of external powers
(particularly Australia and other aid donors) by its citizens.

Management Intensiveness

Both project and program assistance are very management demanding.

In the

implementation of project assistance, the donor has a hands-on approach thereby
increasing the project's viability and prospects for success. Implementation of program
assistance, on the other hand, rests squarely upon the shoulders of the recipient.

Since

recipient countries lack skilled manpower resources (a reason why aid is given in the first
place), implementation can be slow and inadequate.

During an address at the Lae

Colloquium in September 1991, Dr. Neal Blewett stressed that
I do recognise that it is harder, at least at the start, to absorb project
than budget support aid. Projects require skills, especially training in
planning, on the part of both the donors and recipients, and until those
skills are built up, it can be difficult to realise the benefits of project aid
activities. But project aid, once a start is made in implementing it, can
create a virtuous circle - the more people trained in project activities,
the more assistance can be assembled and so on4 I_
That may be so, but skilled manpower in PNG is very scarce and manpower turnover is very high. High staff turnover is related to either promotion (upwards) or shifts
from one government agency and organisation (horizontal) to another, thus robbing
particular programs of skilled personnel and continuity.

41 JCFADT, Australia's Relations with PNG ... , 1991: 141.
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Project Selection

Another contentious issue relates to decision-making in project selection.

In

most instances, the donor takes a prominent role, consequently lessening the control of
the recipient over the use of funds42 .

The recipient argues that project and program

type aid bestow upon the donor a lot of control over decisions relating to selection of
projects and programs, which may not necessarily be consistent with the recipient's
national development policies and objectives43 .

The project identification process

consequently impinges upon the independence of the recipient government.
The issues discussed above all hint at one central theme in the aid relationship
and that is accountability, which subsequently leads to the question of control and hence
political independence and sovereignty.

Though accountability is being pursued and

addressed under PNG's existing domestic framework by the Public Accounts Committee,
Ombudsman Commission and the Judiciary, sentiment in Australia suggests that these
institutions, hindered by lack of skilled personnel, money and evidence do not sufficiently
address the issues.

Incidentally, Australia has been given sufficient avenues for

continuous surveillance of development assistance, such as academics contracted to
produce annual analyses of PNG's economy, which are then incorporated into AIDAB's
policy formulation and implementation process, and also by soliciting firm commitments
from the Government of PNG to expend aid on fundamental economic reforms as a
condition for increased development assistance44 .

The DFAT Annual Report 1989190

also explicitly record that the planning and delivery of most Australia's bilateral aid
involves country papers and annual high level consultations with recipients45 .

The

degree to which PNG is likely to give up its independence and sovereignty by opening its

42 Ibid: 142.
43 See Papua and New Guinea House of Assembly Debates, 1974.
44 AIDAB, "Making Australia's overseas aid count: an overview of AIDAB's quality
assurance machanisms", Appraisals, Evaluation and Sectoral Studies Branch
Development Paper, no. 2, Canberra: AGPS, 1991: 8.
45 DFAT, Annual Report 1989190, 1990: 145.
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books to external powers for inspection and how far Australia would want to make PNG
accountable will depend upon their mutual willingness to compromise (or not).

CONCLUSION

The policy independence of PNG between 1980 and 1990 can be attributed to
one important factor.

Policy independence has its base in the fact that a major

component of Australian aid had been and continues to be unconditional budget support
directly transferred into PNG's national budgetary planning process.

If policy

independence correlates with the level of budget support, then the salient shift toward
project and program aid is likely to undermine PNG's policy independence.
Policy independence has also been improved by the use of Australian
development assistance to increase economic activity, and thus the ability to finance
development programs internally.

CHAPTERS

POLITICS OF DEFENCE CO-OPERATION

The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether, PNG's security perceptions
and policies are the result of independent action or whether they are just a reflection of
Australia's own security perceptions and interests.

I will attempt to discuss these

concerns by considering the differences in the definitions of security, security
arrangements and the type of defence co-operation in place, and what defence cooperation in general is aimed at attaining.

CONCEPTS

In this section I will attempt to define the term security, because this.exercise will
help me to decide whether - and if so, how much - Australia has exerted control or
influence over PNG's policy process.

Security is not a precise term.

Nevertheless, a

number of authors (especially academics) have advanced an array of definitions which,
though imprecise, have attempted to define security.

The reason for the definitional

imprecision is largely due to the fact that security deals with a wide variety of risks which
are difficult to identify and define - the definitions advanced underplay the relative
dimension of security

because security as an absolute condition is emphasised 1.

Absolute security is an impossible condition to attain.
Security has been defined as the ability of a state to defend its core values if
challenged either by avoiding war or by victory in war2 .

Security is also relative

freedom from war3, attained through traditional defence policy and non-military actions
1 B. Duzan, People,
2 W. Lipmann cited

States and Fear, Surrey: Harvester Press, 1983 : 216.
in A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration ..., 1962: 150.
3 I. Bellany, "Towards a theory ofintemational security", Political Studies, vol. 29 no. 1,
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to enhance the survival of the political entity and creating the national and international
conditions in which national interests can be pursued and maintained against potential
and existing adversaries4 . Though all the above have certain merits, I will be using the
definition put forward by John E. Mroz that "security is the relative freedom from
harmful threats" 5.

Mroz's definition avoids absolutist bias and is usefully

comprehensive.

SECURITY PERCEPTIONS

Pacific Island States and PNG

Security issues and threats to island states, including PNG, transcend
conventional military-dominant definitions.

Military threat scenarios have been and

occasionally are projected by external and internal officials, journalists and scholars6 .
Security for Pacific Island Countries including PNG primarily mean[s] political and
economic security7 or security with a small "s" as defined by two authors8. Hence, for

1981: 102.
4 F. Traeger and F. Simonie, "An introduction to the study of national security", in F.
Traeger, F. Simonie and P. Konnenberg, National Security and American Society,
Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1973 : 36.
5 J. Mroz, Beyond Security: Private Perceptions Among Arabs and Israelis, New York:
International Peace Academy, 1980: 105.
6 C. Dorrance and F. Mediansky cited in S. Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs
Handbook, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992: 21 .
7 D. Hegarty and P. Polomka cited in S. Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs
Handbook. .. , 1992: 22; L. Zarsky, "Rivalry and reconstruction: security implications of
the Pacific's dynamism", in R. Walker and W. Sutherland (ed.), The Pacific: Peace,
Security and Nuclear Issues, London: Zed Books Ltd., 1988: 13.
8 P. King, "Redefining South Pacific security: greening and domestication", in R. Thakur
(ed.), The South Pacific: Problems, Issues and Prospects, London: Macmillan, 1990; A.
Siaguru, "Small's' security for small island states", in D. Hegarty and P. Polomka (eds.),
The Security of Oceania in the 1990s vol. 1: Views from the Region, SDSC-RSPacS,
ANU, 1990:
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Pacific Island countries, socio-economic and environmental factors are the real issues
that have the ability to undermine a state's security - inter-ethnic cleavages and rivalry
(PNG); racial (Fiji); economic vulnerability to natural disasters and low commodity
prices (compounded by mono-commodity export economies); global warming which will
increase water levels threatening to drown low atoll island states; narcotics and natural
disasters9 . Consequently, it is no coincidence, than the security and defence policies of
Pacific Island Countries are very broad ranging and multi-dimensional.

Australia

Australia's security threats, to a large extent are military-dominant.

Australian

Defence Department assessments pinpoint the Indonesian Archipelago, together with
PNG as an important factor in any offensive military strategy against Australia 10 .
Threats may have a variety of purposes: firstly, to settle excess population on Australia's
wide open spaces; secondly, to access Australia's natural resources and food; thirdly, to
exert pressure on Australia to modify its policies or actions to the advantage of the
aggressor over issues such as Australia's island territories and off-shore natural resources
and business interests overseas 11 . However, these threat scenarios appear to have been
exaggerated because the threats are now (and have been for some time) become less
credible.

The force required to mount and maintain a threat to Australia over a long

J. Ravenhill, "Political turbulance in the South Pacific", in J. Ravenhill (ed.), No Longer
an American Lake, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989: 2; Australia's Regional Security, a
Ministerial statement by the Minister for Foreign Affars and Trade Gareth Evans to the
Australian Federal Parliament, 1989: paras. 124-134.
10 Australian Defence, a paper presented to the Parliament by the Minister for Defence
Mr. J. Killen in November 1976, Canberra: AGPS, 1976: 7; Australia's Regional
Security, a Ministerial statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Gareth
Evans to the Australian Federal Parliament, 1989: para. 47.
11 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia, a Policy Paper, 1987: 1.
9
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period of time would have to be extremely large (in equipment, manpower, technology
and political will), which the countries in the region lack.
From the above discussion, it can be deduced that Pacific Island countries and
Australia have diverging perceptions as to the most likely sources of threats.

There is

thus, a need for both parties to come to a common agreement on how these diverging
threat perceptions could be moulded into a regional policy mutually beneficial to all
parties. In acknowledgement of this divergence, then Foreign Minister Mr. Bill Hayden
in 1984 stressed the need to develop a security community within the region when he
said
[d]evelopments in Asia [and the Pacific] are going to determine the
future of Australia.. .[I]f we encourage, when we can, stability,
harmony, co-operation... then we are going to get much greater
security for our nation than any piece of paper can guarantee 12 .
In 1989, Mr. Bill Hayden's sentiments were echoed by Foreign Minister Gareth
Evans in his ministerial statement that Australia's security stategy involves the building of
not only co-operative military relations but a multi-dimensional strategy (including the
use of diplomatic, socio-political and economic resources) with states of the Asia-Pacific
region 13 .

This statement by Evans accepted the existence of differences in security

perceptions within the Asia-Pacific region, and also noted that different threats required
different policy responses.

AUSTRALIA-PNG SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

PNG's modem defence relations with Australia predate independence, when a
Papuan Infantry Battalion with a further two battalions in the mandated territory were

12 SSCFAD, Australia's Defence Co-operation with its Neighbours in the Asia-Paci.fie

Region, Canberra: AGPS, 1984: 5.
13 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia..., 1987: 22; JCFADT, Australia's
Relations with the South Pacific, Canberra: AGPS, 1989: 145; Australia's Regional
Security .. ., 1989: para. 6.
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raised during the Second World War in 1940 and fought alongside Australian troops.
The units were disbanded in 1946.

Between 1956 and 1962 the Pacific Islands

Regiment was reformed, laying the foundations for the modem Army, which at
independence became the PNGDF 14 . The units were integral parts of the ADF. It was
not until 1975 that the separation between the newly formed PNGDF and ADF was
made.
PNG is considered by the Australian Defence, security and Foreign Affairs
community as of immediate strategic importance to Australian security.

PNG's

importance to Australia's security lies in its geographic proximity to Australia as stated in
a variety of submissions to inquiries into Australia and PNG relations over the years 15 .
The security importance of PNG to Australia was even used by Queensland in the late
nineteenth century to force Great Britain into officially annexing Southern New Guinea,
and even cited by Mench as a reason why PNG could become a springboard for
aggressive states and eventually threaten Australia 16 .

Thus, Australia in its

consideration of an effective coherent security plan must include PNG in its militarystrategic calculations.
The importance of a secure PNG to Australia is also due to political and
economic considerations 17 .

Firstly, Australia has considerable economic interests and

investment in PNG, in 1990 valued at about A$1.4 billion 18 . Australian business made
about A$ l billion in profit from their commercial activities in PNG. Secondly, instability
also endangers the lives of Australian citizens in PNG 19 . During the Bougainville crises,
the Australian Government had drawn up contingency plans to evacuate its citizens
involving ADF personnel and equipment, but did not need to implement them20 .

P. Mench, The Role of the PNGDF, Canberra: ANU Press, 1975: 23 .
15 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia... , 1987: 7-8; Australia's Regional
Security ... , 1989: paras. 45; 47; JCFADT, Australia's Relations with PNG ..., 1991 : 157.
16 P. Mench, The Role of the PNGDF. .. , 1975: 3.
17 JCFADT, Australia's Relations with PNG .. ., 1991: 158.
18 G. Evans, "Australia and PNG ... ", 1990: 7.
19 JCFADT, Australia's Relations with PNG ..., 1991: 158.
20 E. Wolfers, "The regional security environment: South Pacific", in G. Fry (ed.),
14
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No formal defence treaty exists between Australia and PNG.

However, their

defence relations before political independence in 1975 were conducted under ANZUS
where an armed attack on any party is deemed to include an armed attack. .. on
the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific21 .
PNG's security was linked to ANZUS by virtue of its status as Australia's ·
dependent territory.

In the event that PNG was attacked, Australia and its ANZUS

partners would consult with a view to coming to PNG's aid.

Under the ANZUS

arrangements, military aid in times of external attacks was not guaranteed.

Still, if

communist states were involved in the conflict, the ANZUS alliance would have come to
PNG's aid.

Military aid would not necessarily have been invoked by the treaty articles,

but by the national military strategic interests of the participant signatories to the
ANZUS treaty.
After PNG aceeded to political independence in 1975, its security was no longer
guaranteed under ANZUS.

Nevertheless PNG did enter into a variety of defence

arrangements with Australia under which defence relations have been conducted. These
will be discussed below.

Joint Statement, 1977

In a joint statement on the Defence Relationship between Australia and PNG by
the Prime Ministers of Australia Mr. Malcolm Fraser and PNG Mr. Michael Somare in
1977 both acknowledged
their governments' desire to contribute to the strengthening of peace
and stability in their common region. They declared that it was both

Australia's Regional Security, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991: 77.
21 Article IV cited by E. Wolfers, "Changing context and content of bilateral relations",

in D. Anderson (ed.), The PNG-Australia Relationship: Problems and Prospects,
Sydney: Pacific Security Research Institute, 1990.

110

governments' intentions to consult at the request of either, about
matters affecting their common security interests and about other
aspects of their defence relationship22.
The Joint Statement refers to common security interests, but as discussed earlier
in this chapter, the two countries' perceptions differ - Australia's are militarily and
externally based whilst PNG's are non-military and have internal origins. Proceeding out
of the Joint Statement were a series of other subsidiary agreements in 1977: a status of
forces agreement covering the status of military personnel domiciled in the other state; a
Consultative arrangement covering the placement and use of loan personnel in politically
sensitive positions; a Supply Support Agreement, formalising arrangements for giving
PNG access to material procurement through the Australian Defence Department; and a
Statement of Understanding covering common security interests23 .

Yet the

formalisation of defence relations did not guarantee PNG unconditional aid in times of
need. This view was accepted in 1982 when the Government of PNG declared that no
other government or country (not even Australia) has offered to underwrite PNG's
security and no one was and is likely to do so in the future2 4 .

Joint Declaration of Principles (JDP)

The closest thing to a formal security arrangement is enshrined in the JDP signed
in 198725 :

*

Recognising that each government has primary responsible for its
own security, the two governments undertake to continue to maintain
and develop their respective defence capabilities.

22 The Joint Statement, 1977 cited in SSCFAD, Australia's Defence Co-operation with
its Neighbours ... , 1984: Appendix 4.
23 R. May, 1he Changing Role of the Military in PNG, SDSC-RSPacS, ANU, 1993 : 16.
24 Foreign Policy cited by E. Wolfers, "The changing context and contents of bilateral
relations ... ", 1990: 16.
25 JDP cited in JCF ADT, Australia's Relations with PNG..., 1991: 172.
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*

Conscious of their unique historical links and shared strategic
interests the two governments will continue to engage in defence cooperation through consultation and in such areas, as agreed exchanges,
consultations, combined projects, military training and combined
exercises as would be decided by them from time to time.

* The two governments reaffirm the existing agreement and
arrangements between the two countries covering the status of services
personnel from either country present in the other, the provision of
supply support and consultations on politically sensitive situations in
which Australian personnel might be involved.
*

The two governments will consult at the request of either, about
matters affecting their common security interests. In the event of
external armed attack threatening the national sovereignty of either
country, such consultation would be conducted for the purpose of each
government deciding what measures shouJd be taken jointly or
separately in relation to the attack.
The JDP formalised the already existing defence relations between the two states
and also clarified the general expectations of behaviour of the two parties in the event of
armed attacks. However, like its predecessors, the JDP does not guarantee immediate
help from Australia or vice-versa in the event of external attack.

In spite of this, then

Defence Secretary Stephen Mokis considered the undertakings in the JDP as providing
an effective guarantee of Australian commitment, and indeed argued further that PNG
considers Australia as a security guarantor in the event of uncertainty and threats26 .
Military aid in the event of external attack would only be rendered after
consultations between the two at the request of the threatened partner have taken place.
Even after consultations, it does not necessarily follow that help will be automatically
forthcoming.

Both parties will have to decide what if any, joint actions will be

undertaken. The process discussed above implicitly ensures that no party will be forced
or dragged into a situation contrary or otherwise detrimental to its national interests.

26

S. Mokis cited by R. May, The Changing Role of the Military in PNG..., 1993: 36.
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Agreed Statement on Security Co-operation Between Australia and PNG, 1991

The Agreed Statement on Security Co-operation was signed by the Prime
Minister of Australia Mr. Bob Hawke and the Prime Minister of PNG Mr. Rabbie
Namaliu on 2 of September 1991 .

The aim of the Agreed Statement was to identify

priorities for bilateral co-operation in the future which were determined through and by
constant reviews of PNG's security needs and the impact of Australia's security
assistance programs on PNG's security and needs. Out of the various security reviews, a
number of principal findings were given prominence:

* Internal security needs are to be given the highest priority by PNG,
which requires security if development is to proceed and development
if security is to be maintained
*

PNG requires a comprehensive, integrated and planned approach to
its overall security requirements which, while recognising the need for
external defence, reflects the higher priority to be given to internal
security, including law and order

*

Security co-operation between Australia and PNG must be
developed in ways which reflect these changing priorities27 .
In order to fulfil the above principal findings, areas of security co-operation were
identified to which both the Governments of Australia and PNG were committed. Both
governments concluded that the ongoing DCP should be as wide-ranging as possible,
explicitly designed to strengthen national self-reliance.

Co-operation includes the

training of security personnel in maintaining internal security (including law and order),
development of infrastructure and facilities for law enforcement agencies and exchange
of personnel between the security agencies of the two countries28 . Co-operation under
the DCP was supplemented by the PNG Government's introduction of the integrated
security plan which was recommended by the National Crime Summit in 1991 .

27 Agreed Statement on Security Co-operation between Australia and PNG, 1991.
28

Ibid
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The co-operation alluded to in the Agreed Statement is based upon other
arrangements reached earlier, such as the JDP which provide points of reference for
future security co-operation between the two countries. The points of reference include
mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, the principle that exchanges and cooperation will be strictly determined by the fact that security is a national responsibility
and the nation's resources capacity, and that bilateral co-operation should not undermine
the development of security relations with other countries.

The Agreed Statement

complements the defence related clauses enshrined within the JDP of 1987, the Status of
Forces Agreement (1977), the Defence Supply Support (1977) and other related
agreements.

Still, the Agreed Statement did not guarantee PNG's security,

as co-

operation would only be available under the limited conditions enshrined in the JDP basically that help in times of military confrontation would not be automatic, but would
be very much dependent upon each country's national socio-economic, political and
military-strategic interests.

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION PROGRAM (DCP)

The changes betwee 1980 and 1990 with regards to shared perceptions of
sources of likely threats, so that they include non-military sources as well as other than
the conventional military threat, have impacted upon security policies both at home and
abroad. Security policies and responses include economic assistance, co-operation and
collaboration, diplomacy and defence co-operation29 . Australia has accepted the change
shift and has, accordingly, made attempts to tailor its aid to foster a stable socioeconomic and political environment in PNG and the wider Asia-Pacific region.

In

search of security, Australia employs two interrelated policy instruments: the first

G. Fry, "Australia's regional security doctrine: old assumptions, new challenges", in G.
Fry (ed.), Australia's Regional Security, Sydney: Allen and Unwin Australia Pty. Ltd.,
1991: 6; 9.
29
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involves the provision of economic and official development assistance to improve the
economy and the stability of socio-political and economic structures and institutions, and
the second involves the provision of military assistance via the DCP.

The role of

economic and development assistance in the pursuit of PNG's overall development and
security has been discussed in chapter 5.

It suffices to state here that socio-economic

related development assistance has contributed substantially toward a relatively stable
PNG, also indirectly fulfilling Australia's own security objectives by promoting economic
and social development; reducing political disaffection caused by economic deprivation;
creating commercial opportunities for

Australian companies; and encouraging

perceptions of Australia as a generous, practical and technologically competent
neighbour30 .
The DCP originally was confined to improving military capability by providing
personnel training, loan personnel, capital expenditures and equipment. But its activities
have expended to include the provision of non-military aid such as road construction.
Aid assistance provided under the DCP can be classified into three types: joint projects,
services advisory assistance (mainly reimbursement) to the ADF for salaries and
allowances, and training on attachments and PNGDF personnel study visits to
Australia3 1.

The breadth of the assistance provided highlights the multi-dimensional

character of security needs in PNG , and security relations with Australia.

Objectives of the Defence Co-operation Program

The objectives of the DCP enunciated by the SSCFAD inquiry into Australia's
DCP with neighbouring countries in 1984 were echoed by the Department of Defence in

its Defence Report 1988-1989 as being to

30 Australia's Regional Security ... , 1989: para.

115.
31Major M. Smith, "Australian military aid: appraisal and verdict", Defence Force
Journal, November/December 1984: 6.
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promote Australia's security ...and to facilitate co-operative defence
activities with countries in these regions32.
The DCP is not meant to be the foundation for military alliances and does not
endorse recipient governments' domestic policies on for example, human rights. Defence
Department submissions to the 1984 Parliamentary inquiry also suggested that the DCP
was "intended to promote the national independence of participating countries and that
DCP was also a practical expression of [Australia's] interest in regional security" 33 . The
Foreign Affairs Department submission to the same inquiry identified non-military
purposes as legitimate objectives ofDCP in order to (1) to round out and advance bilateral relations in which defence links
form a part of the friendly and co-operative association with other
countries;

(2) to promote political stability and economic growth in the region
through civil aid projects where they take place under the program;
(3) to foster friendly attitudes towards Australia on a popular level34 .
The objectives of the DCP submitted to the 1984 inquiry differed between the
Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade: for the Defence Department, the
DCP was predominantly to enhance security by improving the capability of the defence
establishment, whilst the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade viewed it as a
component of Australia's overall overseas development aid. Though these views have
merged so that non-military programs are funded under the DCP, their implementation
I

remains the responsibility of the Defence Department, which continues to resist pressure
from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade pressure to take control of nonmilitary projects funded under the DCP.

In spite of the DCP's foray into non-military programs and projects, without
doubt, its foremost role remains the development of military capabilities of countries
within the Asia-Pacific regions.

This aspect of the DCP may not be applicable to the

32 SSCFAD, Australia's Defence Co-operation with its Neighbours ... , 1984; Department
ofDefence, Defence Reports 1988189, 1989: 58.
33 SSCFAD, Australia's Defence Co-operation with its Neighbours ... , 1984: 5.
34 Ibid: 6.
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countries of the South Pacific, because most of the threats they face have non-military
origins (natural disasters, inter-ethnic rivalry, etc ...,) and conventional military threats
remain very remote.

As island states will attest, standing armies are not a necessary

condition for independence - most island states are already politically independent and do
not have standing armies. The wide-ranging view of security has been given prominence
by changes in official Australian policy statements and documents acknowledging a
major shift of emphasis in recent years in relation to projects and programs funded under
DCP to the South Pacific, for example so that the DCP is used to improve maritime
surveillance under the Pacific Patrol Boat Program in order to protect Pacific Island
countries' 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones from illegal poachers 35 .

Assistance Under the Defence Co-operation Program

Between the 1979/80 and 1990/91 financial years, Australia has given PNG about
A$466. 1 million in total aid under the DCP36 . The total financial assistance comprises
about 7 percent of the total gross Australian aid to PNG over the same period.
the inception ofDCP, PNG has been the major recipient (see Tablel2).

35 JCFADT, Australia's Relations with the South Pacific ... , 1989: 156.
36 BRP for various years between 1979/80 and 1990/91.

Since
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Table 12: Australia's Defence Co-operation with its Asia-Pacific Neighbours,
1980181 to 1990191 (A$ million)37.
Year

PNG

ASEAN

1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91

14.2
15.2
16.7
17.3
16.4
16.0
19.1
21.7
24.2
27.4
24.2
27.4

13 .2
17.0
13 .8
16.7
16.2
16.9
22.3
19.5
16.1
15.6
16.1
15.6

South Pacific Other

8.0
13 .1
16.5
16.1
16.5
16.1

2.7
5.6
9.2
10.3
12.9
12.4
0.8
0.8
0.7
1.5
0.7
1.5

For the financial years 1979/80, 1985/86 and 1990/91 allocations to PNG under
the DCP were 25 percent, 38 percent and 45 percent respectively of the total annual
Australian defence co-operation budget. This shows that Australian defence aid to PNG
has been increasing as a proportion of the overall Australian DCP during the decade
under consideration.

The increases in defence aid to PNG also coincided with the

frequent callout of troops in aid of civilian authority to restore law and order and the
beginning of the Bougainville crises in 1988/89.

Internal security rather than external

threat considerations have been responsible for the increases.

The increase in the actual

amount of defence aid reflects its diversification to include the funding of non-military
programs and projects personnel development of both the police and defence forces with
a view to improving management and administrative capabilities.
The major expense has been related to the attachment and secondment of ADF
personnel to the PNGDF and the RPNGC services. In the 1983/84 financial year, that
expense accounted for over half of DCP expenditure at A$9.9 million out of a total
allocation of A$17.1 million38 . In the 1989/90 allocation, payments for attachments and

37 All

these figures have been collected from the Australian Federal Government,
Budget Statements between 1981/83 and 1986/87; BRP Defence Portfolio Explanatory
Notes for 1988/89 and 1989/90, 1988, 1989 and 1990.
38 Major M. Smith, "Australian military aid ... ", 1984: Annex A 13-14.
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secondments increased to A$12.3 million, even though the number of ADF members in
PNG had decreased from a high of 160 in 1982 to about 89 in 1989/9039 . Equipment,
infrastructure and technical development projects have increased from a low of A$6.2
million to A$2 l .9 million in 1989/90.

The increase in infrastructure, equipment and

technical costs relate to the relocation of Air Transport Squadron from Lae to Port
Moresby (at a total relocation cost of A$ l 8. 0 million) for a first appropriation of A$7. 0
million, Lombrum Wharf construction of A$ l. 9 million, Rotary Wing capability
assistance of A$4.9 million, joint engineering project management of A$1 .0 million and
the continuing Pacific Patrol Boat Assistance of A$4.7 million40 .

Training, exercise

and, at attachments remain approximately the same A$3 million, in the same financial
year.
However, the shift from military oriented programs and projects to include nonmilitary security related issues, is a slow one.

There has now been acceptance that

issues relating to fisheries and environment are the most significant threats to small island
states' security because, without money being generated from their exploitation, the
island countries cannot be successful in maintaining their statehood.

Consequently, the

DCP is now being directed toward fostering and maintaining respect for island states'
sovereignty by improving their economic capacity, thereby minimising interference by
foreign states in their domestic affairs.

ISSUES OF CONTENTION

Several contentious issues regarding the nature and effects of defence-related aid
were highlighted during the SSCFAD inquiry in 198441 . The relevance or irrelevance of
these issues and their impact upon the DCP between Australia and PNG will be
discussed below:

39 Budget Statements 1982183, 1981: 72.
40 BRP, 1989: 157.
41 SSCFAD, Australia's Defence Co-operation with its Neighbours .. .,

1984: 53-66.
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(1)

The notion that defence co-operation determines the participant's national

independence.
The promotion of "national independence of participating countries" as an
objective of DCP is misleading because, as is evident throughout the world there are
states (particularly small states) which do not owe their independence to any kind of
DCP and related activities.

The implication of the notion that national independence is

directly a result of DCP is that the possession of military capabilities is necessary for
national independence. However, the notion that national independence is being due to
the DCP is incorrect, because countries in the South Pacific, such as Tuvalu, Kiribati,
Nauru, Cook Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, do not base their national
independence upon the possession of military capabilities.

(2) Australia's regional strategic interests mean that the DCP is used to support regimes

with bad human rights records.
Australian military assistance has been driven by regional military-strategic
considerations, with minimum regard to distinguishing between recipient countries which
violate human rights and those that have good human rights records.

The relationship

between human rights and the DCP were highlighted in 1989 with regard to military aid
to PNG by Australia. It was alleged by human rights activists that Australia was arming
the PNG troops in its war against Bougainville rebels - the equipment donated
(helicopters) were used in the suppression of citizens42 .

(3) The DCP should not be involved in civil projects as it duplicates what AIDAB does

The issue was raised because military aid to fund civil projects was seen as a
duplication of AIDAB's functions.
were wasted on the same.

Limited resources (manpower, finance and time)

In other words, if civil projects are to be implemented,

42 JCFADT, Australia's relations with PNG ... , 1991: 165.
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AIDAB should be the executing agency rather than the Defence Department, in order to
limit wastage and duplication.

(4) The DCP encourages the "lock-in" of recipients into Australian equipment
There is evidence to suggest that the DCP does in fact develop markets for
Australian military exports. The lock-in did occur, for example, with Nomad planes to
Indonesia and PNG.

In the South Pacific, a similar lock-in through the Patrol Boats

given under the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, which require Australian made spare parts
and training.

(5) The DCP provokes long-term budgetary problems among recipients
This is a genuine problem for most Pacific Island States. Evidence has emerged
that island countries that have received Patrol Boats from Australia have been unable to
keep them running continuously, because of high maintenance and operational costs.
This problem has been overcome by annual Australian financial help for fuel and
operational costs under the DCP.

Even PNG has to rely on Australia for its helicopter

pilots, maintenance of helicopters and patrol boats.

CONCLUSION

Military assistance to PNG from Australia has been generally in the form of
projects and programs, including equipment (Nomads, patrol boats, training, joint
exercises, etc, ... ) and skilled personnel and exchanges. As argued elsewhere (in chapter
5 where Development Assistance was discussed), project aid increases the opportunities
for donor influence in determining the projects and programs to be funded, especially
regarding purchases of equipment and training.

In fact, in 1989, when Australia gave

PNG the helicopters, the Australian Government expressly directed the PNG
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Government not to use the helicopters as gunships - an example of donor determined use
of equipment.

However, the SSCFAD inquiry in 1984 found that all recipients have

maintained policy independence from Australia because of the fact that the DCP is not
viewed by Australia as geared toward establishing alliance commitments43 .
Despite occasional exceptions, Australia has generally lacked control over the
expenditure of military assistance, because Australia is not able to exert control, but the
programs and projects requested for funding by the PNG Government significantly
coincide with national and regional definitions of security, and PNG's military-strategic
interests.

'2f3 SSCF AD, Australia's Defence Co-operation witli its Neighbmirs .. ., 1984: -56. -

CHAPTERS

CONCLUSION: INDEPENDENCE AND CHANGE

Policy independence is not necessarily constrained by a country being in a
dependent relationship with a developed (or militarily strong) state for trade, investment,
aid, security, education and manpower recruitment and training. Opportunities will arise
for the exercise of policy independence for the smaller state. These opportunities, as I
have suggested, will originate from other sources, such as power of the weak,
decolonisation and normalisation of bilateral relations, and coinciding (national) interests.
Policy independence originating from the concept of the power of the weak
suggests that small states gain independence because of (a) major powers' preoccupation
with immediate conflicts, and their giving less attention to marginal issues; and (b) the
paradox of unrealised power.

The unrealised power paradox suggests that the power

potential of the major states is not actualised because (i) the targeted party has third
party help with similar levels of power potential; (ii) there is a lack of resolve to win (no
major motivation for example, such as protection of family and country); and (iii) a wide
range of foreign policy objectives competing for scarce resources, which implies that
some objectives will become lower in priority because of their negligible impact upon the
interests of the larger, more powerful state.
The second explanation for policy independence relates to the concept of
decolonisation.

Policy independence attributed to decolonisation emerges from the

formal attainment of political independence, which involves the severing of colonial
relations and the transfer of power (both political and administrative) and the function of
conducting external affairs to the newly established post-colonial government.

It also

involves a continuing process, because political independence and the severing of formal
colonial relations do not by definition, bring to an end the former coloniser's influence
over the newly independent state.

The colonisers continue to influence a former
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colony's policy by way of economic, military-strategic, cultural and educational leverage,
consequently rendering external policy subordinate to the interests of colonial powers.
But, as economic self-sufficiency is achieved (either by diversification or growth),
opportunities for independence emerge which may be taken advantage of by the smaller
state.
The final explanation of policy independence can be said to emerge from
coinciding interests. At this level, coincidence of foreign policy objectives, in relation to
military-strategic, environmental and economic (resource exploitation) factors, for
example, fosters a desire for co-operation.

It also implies that the states recognise

limitations on their ability to attain shared objectives on their own, thus leading to joint
action, based on acknowledgement of their individual incapabilities compounded by an
inherent lack of resources.

If certain policy objectives coincide and the policy

suggested by the small state is parallel or similar to the major state's, disagreement and
conflict are by definition, likely to be absent.

Consequently, the lack or abscence of

disagreement and conflict may lead to the conclusion that policy independence is evident.
But the conclusion may, of course not be as true as it seems.

Independence can

sometimes be traced to the fact that smaller countries generally are involved at lower
levels of diplomacy with local issues that do not threaten or conflict with major powers'
interests - hence difference may be real, but conflict may be absent.
The above explanations provide us with answers to questions raised in the
dissertation regarding relations between Australia and PNG.

Considering that PNG is

economically dependent on Australia (particularly for aid, imports and investment), I can
only conclude that policy independence is likely to be minimal.

However, if the same

relationship is considered in the light of power of the weak, decolonisation and
coinciding interests, it is possible to make a case that PNG's independence has its origins
in such factors.
Though PNG is of importance to Australia, PNG's western political orientations
and pro-western outlook meant Australia did not have to spend resources or maintain a
hands-on approach to keep PNG within the western sphere of influence. This situation,
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I would argue, inadvertently provided an opportunity for policy independence in PNG.
The impact of decolonisation and normalisation has also been suggested as another
explanation of the manifestation of PNG's independence.

Firstly, in acceding to

independence in 1975, PNG assumed responsibility for its own external policy function .
Secondly, though PNG was politically independent, its foreign policy continued to be
subordinate to Australia, reflecting particularly its substantial economic dependence.
But with the diversification of trade, aid and investment away from Australia, PNG has
become less and less reliant on a single source, thereby increasing opportunities for
independent action.

Finally, as PNG foreign affairs officials and leaders have become

more experienced and more confident in pursuing successfully PNG's national interests,
and as new leaders have emerged with very little attachment to the former coloniser,
foreign policy became more independent.

However, it is also the case that policy

independence has occured because the interests and objectives of both states coincide.
If there were divergence, then the possibility of Australian influence would be high.

In

fact, the last source of policy independence ts very much dependent upon the
identification - and pursuit - of common interests.
PNG's policy independence in relation to Australia is therefore, not necessarily
related to economic diversification, because PNG is still substantially dependent upon
Australia for aid, as a source of imports and investment.

Policy independence is,

moreover, likely to become less evident as budget support ceases in the year 2000 and is
replaced completely by project and program aid. Inevitably, the implementation of such
aid will have greater donor input. But, even with this development, I would still expect
PNG to maintain and display considerable policy independence.

This will be possible

because the explanations of policy independence as due to the power of the weak,
decolonisation and coinciding interests will still apply.

Their relevance does not depend

upon economic factors but on the nature of relations and interests both states pursue.
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